THEOLOGY

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Edited by the Dean of Winchester, The Deanery, Winchester, to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

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EDITORIAL

An editor's good fortune is sometimes better than his designs; and we count it a happy coincidence which has brought into one number Mr. Balmforth's article on "The Ethical Significance of Worship," Canon Beibitz's review of Baron von Hügel's posthumous book, and Mr. Bezzant's masterly appreciation of Dr. Kirk's *magnum opus*, *The Vision of God*. Mr. Balmforth's article, like Canon Hodgson's last month, is longer than we commonly care to print in one issue: but both seemed to call especially for reading at one sitting, before being made the subject (as each should be) of more detailed study. And the times are exigent of big subjects broadly handled. The prevailing insecurity which now affects the life of the whole world is no new thing to the Churchman, however much it may surprise the man in the street. And we can already see signs of a widespread desire for teaching of the main truths of the Christian life and outlook on the part of many who until lately thought that the Gospel was spent. It is a time for the Word of God: but it must be set forth broadly and searchingly, if it is to reach all who wish to learn.

One of the latest additions to Messrs. J. M. Dent and Sons' "Everyman's Library" is *Pascal's Pensées*, with a brief but illuminating Introduction by Mr. T. S. Eliot. The book is in every way comfortable both to hand and eye; and few of the classics speak more directly to our condition. What an interesting contrast is afforded between this great mathematician of the seventeenth century and the Bishop of Birmingham in our own day in their handling of religious themes! Each is in a sense only accidentally a divine. But while the modern Bishop is trying to cut Christianity according to the cloth of the latest science, Pascal has gone to the root of the matter, which lies in epistemology; and out of the very scepticism which the limits of scientific knowledge impose has built the splendid edifice of faith.

THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WORSHIP

I.

RELIGION is notoriously hard to define. But whatever be the ingredients of which it is compounded, and however variously they may be blended in any one specimen, the idea of worship seems to be necessary to the existence of Religion. Primitive man has his more or less elaborate ritual cultus before anything that can be called a theology or any system of religious ethics. The historical religions of civilized mankind without exception have sacred places, and persons whose functions include the maintenance of a traditional and organized worship at those places. From the rude shrine of the fetish-worshipper to the magnificent temples, mosques, and cathedrals of the great religions of the world, religion is accompanied and expressed by sacrificial and other rites whereby man voices his sense of awe and dependence and submission in face of the superhuman powers. Even positivists and Ethical societies will sing hymns to Humanity, and the defiant atheism of a modern sceptic finds itself seeking "a free man's worship."

Historic Christianity has been no less ready than Judaism or the ethnic religions to give cultus a prominent place. Common worship and private prayer have been normal Christian obligations since the beginning, and for centuries the rule or custom of hearing mass on Sundays has been widely imposed by ecclesiastical authority as one of the essential duties of every Christian. The divinely sanctioned sacramental system and the practice and teaching of the Lord about prayer are the primary religious grounds for the cardinal importance attached to worship in Christendom. But the basis of Christianity in a definitely supernatural theism provides a congruous ground in reason, as we shall see. The anthropological or psychological fact of worship, as inherent in man's religious activity, accordingly receives powerful support both from the unquestionable authority of Christ and from the rational implications of theism.

Doubtless it was his own overpowering personal experience of the glory and goodness of God that led Friedrich von Hügel to pronounce with such sweeping simplicity his now famous judgment, "religion is adoration."* But this judgment, as we have briefly indicated, is no mere rapturous explosion of feeling. Historically, theologically, and philosophically, there is good

* See the Memoir (p. 51) prefixed to the *Selected Letters*.

reason for it, even if it had been made by a mind equipped with none of von Hügel's massive scholarship and penetrating insight. And yet it might seem as though we had here an exaggeration, a distortion of emphasis, just when we test the epigram by applying it to the noblest of religions, Christianity. For Christianity, religion's true nature is determined by the mind of Christ; and before we can feel confident of the substantial truth of von Hügel's dictum, we must see it in the light of what Dr. Gore has called the "almost wholly ethical" character of the Lord's teaching.* The cult-element does not bulk large in the gospels. Much that directly preceded, and in part determined, the earthly career and teaching of the Lord, and much that has since been inspired by His teaching, has found the specific excellence of religion not so much in worship as in virtue; and this discovery has often been represented as an advance in true religion and as in accordance with the mind of Christ.

Thus, in the prophetic teaching of which Jesus was historically the heir, we find again and again a tension between the ethical demands of the prophets and the institutional cultus of the people to whom they were sent. We may reasonably doubt whether any of the prophets simply rejected the sacrificial worship as such. But the tension is undoubtedly there. It appears most plainly in the famous passage in Micah that ends with the challenge, "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"† Hosea speaks with a like definiteness: "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings."‡ Elsewhere in the prophets there are similar passages,§ which—whatever be their exact measure of disapproval of the contemporary religious worship—show at least a strongly marked ethical stress, a disposition to find in moral behaviour, rather than in cultus, the true worship of God. When we turn to the gospels, our Lord is twice represented as quoting with approval the words of Hosea, "I desire mercy, and not sacrifice";‖ and throughout the gospels He is mainly occupied in unfolding the ethical requirements for those who would be citizens of the Kingdom of God. In Christian history Protestantism, while retaining public worship and inculcating private prayer, has looked with suspicion and distrust on what it has regarded as the mediæval corruption of true Christianity from

* *Jesus of Nazareth*, p. 91.

† Micah vi. 6-8 (which some think not to be the work of Micah himself). On the whole matter, see the admirably judicious discussion in Hicks, *Fullness of Sacrifice*.

‡ Hosea vi. 6.

§ *Cf.* Amos v. 21-5; Isaiah i. 11-17; Jeremiah vii. 21-8. ‖ Matt. ix. 13, xii. 7.

a predominantly ethical teaching into a paganized ceremonial. In general, it has often been urged that the natural man is prone to substitute "dead works" for that interior obedience to the moral law which is worship "in spirit and in truth." Catholicism has been accused of an over-ready disposition to compromise with this tendency, and an unsympathetic observer might be willing to echo the dictum of Rudolf Sohm, "the natural man is a born Catholic."

The Christian moralist has, then, the task of reconciling the religious impulse to worship with the ethical insistence of the prophetic teaching and of the New Testament. To establish the ethical significance of worship we need first a close scrutiny of the essential nature of worship in its developed form, as it appears in a mature religious experience. It will then appear that worship is not merely capable of being moralized, but that it holds an inalienable place within the sphere of positive Christian duty.

II.

Leaving aside all questions of origin, we find that worship in its developed form is a complex system of mental attitudes. Its most primitive element would seem to be that of *awe* in the presence of the supernatural and mysterious, or, to use Otto's terminology, the "numinous." This element seems to persist as an essential factor in all vital religious worship, even the most spiritual and most fully moralized. Worship is directed towards a supernatural Object, whose inherent mystery, majesty and potency evoke awe, whatever other qualities that Object may be thought to possess. It is sometimes said that the doctrine of God's Fatherhood minimizes this factor or even excludes it from a truly Christian attitude towards God, and that the retention of anything like the "fear of God" is a return to pre-Christian levels of religion. It seems, rather, that Otto is right in saying that "its disappearance would be indeed an essential loss."* To strip the Eternal God of His attributes of incomprehensible majesty and ineffable holiness is to cheapen the whole idea of Deity, and to sentimentalize religion into a kind of spiritual cosiness. Nor is it possible to bring such a version of Christianity to terms with the opening petition of the Lord's Prayer or the emphatic "Fear him" of another familiar logion.† At the same time it needs to be said, in view of the tendencies represented by such writers as Otto, Barth, and Brunner, that the mere recognition of a *mysterium tremendum* which is "wholly other" is definitely not Christian worship, since it falls short of the specific difference made by the Christian revelation.

* *Idea of the Holy* (E.T.), p. 17. † St. Luke xii. 5.

That difference we may indicate first by adding the very different quality of *delight* as the next factor in our analysis of worship. It is a commonplace that joy was one of the most marked features of the young Christian Church; and emancipation from supernatural terror is one of the most commonly observed consequences of conversion to the Christian faith in pagan countries. These two characteristics appear in Christian worship. Since the Ultimate Mystery is known by revelation to be the Heavenly Father and the God of love, the worship of God takes on the double character of awe and delight; that exquisitely beautiful union of creaturely submission and spontaneous joy rings through the liturgies of Christendom and rises to supreme heights in the spiritual writings of the saints and mystics. This is the very stuff of adoration; and human experience can find nothing to surpass it. The *Te Deum* and the *Gloria in excelsis* have this dual note. For an example among spiritual writers we may well go to St. John of the Cross, least sentimental of saints, who, if anyone, stresses the "Otherness" and the incomprehensible and ineffable glory of God. Yet to that *Infinito* he can pour out his soul in these glowing words: "O sweetest love of God, too little known, he who has found Thee is at rest; let everything be changed, O God, that we may rest in Thee. Everywhere with Thee, O my God, everywhere all things with Thee; as I wish, O my Love, all for Thee, nothing for me—nothing for me, everything for Thee. O my God, how sweet to me Thy presence, who art the supreme Good! I will draw near to Thee in silence, and will uncover Thy feet, that it may please Thee to unite me to Thyself, making my soul Thy bride; I will rejoice in nothing till I am in Thine arms. O Lord, I beseech Thee, leave me not for a moment, because I know not the value of mine own soul."*

It follows inevitably that we must add *love* as an essential constituent of Christian worship. The prevenient love of God awakens a grateful response which finds expression in worship. Worship is an offering of love no less than of awe and delight. In the long history of Christian spirituality there is no lack of the metaphysical note, for the Platonist tradition is strong in it; nor again is the note of moral purity and stern dutifulness wanting in the heroic renunciations and asceticism of the saints. But that which makes any Kantian moralism or any Hegelian intellectualism seem so strangely inadequate as an account of what religion really means is the outpouring of love, warm, personal and intimate, which irradiates every page of the great literature of devotion. The God of religion, and notably of the

* I owe this quotation to Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 228 (3rd edition).

Christian religion, has never been merely the lawgiver or merely the solution of the world-riddle. He has been the soul's Beloved. The same feature marks the popular cult as well as the ineffable experience of the mystic and the contemplative: the hymn-book, the Christmas crib, the myriad little gifts and services that flow into the churches are evidence enough. It is no accident that the Holy Family, the Madonna and Child, the Good Shepherd, and other tender and gracious figures, are such familiar and oft-repeated symbols. They prove the loving simplicity with which, despite much embarrassed reticence, much formalism and conventionality, Christian men do approach their God.

In this combined delight and love the primitive sense of the numinous receives its purification and its enrichment. It is rescued from superstitious terrors, and remains as the spring of reverence and adoration. And in its turn it saves worship from sentimentality and trivial emotionalism, those malodorous allies of desupernaturalized religion.

Emotional attitudes cannot be detached, except for purposes of analysis, from the activities to which they lead as their psychological release. Where they occur apparently without results in action, their sincerity at once falls under suspicion. Love, in particular, seeks expression. Accordingly, we cannot detach from worship the activity to which it leads under the complex impulse of its other constituent elements; this activity may be described as *self-surrender for use* with the sense of *mission*.

No better example of this can be taken than the classic and familiar instance of Isaiah.* The prophet, worshipping in the temple, is lifted to the heights of vision. His visionary experience is of the glory and splendour of God, and he seems to be admitted to a share in the heavenly worship. Humiliated by the sense of his own unworthiness, he is comforted by the Divine forgiveness, symbolized as purifying fire. The mystical experience might then seem to be complete. But like Plato's philosopher, who, having seen the true light, must return to the cave to enlighten the chained captives there, Isaiah is not left to enjoy his moment of vision as a mere personal favour. He hears the voice of God calling him, and is then and there started on his prophetic mission, which comes to him as both divinely given and yet at the same time assumed by a free act of his own will. Worship and mystical experience are incomplete, if not actually spurious, without the incorporation of the worshipper in the purpose of the Divine life. The subtlest form of idolatry

* Isaiah vi. 1-8.

is that which sees God as static Beauty for æsthetic contemplation instead of as the ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας.*

Some such experience, in infinite variety of completeness and detail, we must include in any worthy conception of what worship means. Its presence serves to establish more fully the general conclusion about the nature of worship to which our analysis brings us.

We may state it in the words of Cassian: "He who prays only on his knees prays but little."† Worship is not primarily a ritual or ceremonial act, but a quality of life. In Aristotle's language it might be called the ἐνέργεια of man, in which man fulfils the "end" of his being as a creature meant to know and love his Creator. Only life lived in a certain relation to God can be called in the fullest sense worship. What that relation is depends upon the revealed will of God as it bears upon the right mode of human living, and this revealed will is to be found in the two Commandments of the gospel. To love God with all one's heart and one's neighbour as oneself is the sum of all necessary wisdom for the conduct of life. Accordingly, the true worship, "in spirit and in truth," is the life of the Commandments of the gospel, and therefore the supreme example of the morally good life. Morality *is* worship, and worship *is* morality, unless we make the cardinal error of supposing that the whole duty of man is summed up in the second only of the two gospel Commandments, neglecting the first. For to love God in sincerity, as Christian teachers from St. John onwards have insisted, requires and includes the love of man. But the love of man alone is not worship; it is not even religion. It is secularism, which is not necessarily an evil thing, though it falls short, by about ninety-nine per cent., of the truth. Not that the gross deficiency in truth is necessarily proportionate to the moral worth of a good life based on a this-worldly ethic, since there is much unconscious service of God in any man who follows his conscience and the dictates of human kindness. But what we may call the moralistic fallacy, which sees in philanthropy alone the whole area of religious experience, is an insidious danger to religion, in some ways more to be dreaded than a consciously irreligious secularism. For it cuts the central nerve of religion, while claiming to be the pure essence of religion.

"Religion is adoration": the dictum is profoundly Christian and profoundly ethical as well, for all those whose moral philosophy does not hang in the air, but is rooted in a theistic metaphysic. Moral goodness is perfectly possible with a naturalistic

* I despair of translating this excellent phrase of Aristotle's for the specifically Divine activity which is free from any of the imperfections of temporal process.

† Conferences, x. 14.

or secularist morality. But it is not Christian morality, which always seeks its own metamorphosis into holiness. This distinction between holiness and moral goodness is real and necessary. Sanctity transfigures the good life, as the mere moralist understands it; and the means of that transfiguration is worship. Worship is the *differentia* of holiness, as it is of religion generally. Nor is there in this view any distortion of the New Testament emphasis. The ethical stress of the New Testament is very far from being the result of any this-world morality, or purely philanthropic concern. It is there because the underlying *religious* foundation of an unquestioned theocentric view of life is so sure and is so entirely taken for granted. The ethics of the gospels are the ethics of the supernatural Kingdom of God. It is worse than useless for either moralist or historian to approach them on any other assumption.

III.

"Not only with our lips but in our lives": the familiar phrase reveals the dual significance of worship, and aptly conjoins with a delicately adjusted emphasis the two aspects that it wears. Worship, we have said, is primarily a quality of life: it is the orientation of behaviour Godwards. But while the worship of our lives is primary, there are also the detached, concrete acts of deliberate attention to God in public and private worship. On what grounds does worship in this more restricted sense find its justification?

We may distinguish, first, between worship and devotion to a cause or ideal. The offering of a man's life to a cause is not worship. It is only by a conscious metaphor, and with some deliberately whimsical exaggeration, that we can speak of an enthusiast "worshipping" Socialism, the League of Nations, or the Boy Scout Movement. For worship there must be what we may broadly call "the Supernatural Real,"* which may be quite vaguely conceived as no more than a *numen*, but must combine the two qualities of superhuman status and real existence "outside" the mind of the worshipper. Only on these conditions can the characteristic features of worship show themselves. We do not worship the merely human (except in a few surviving archaisms); still less do we worship the merely subhuman. The "worship" of the saints in Christendom is theologically distinguished in kind from the worship of God,†

* I prefer some such phrase to Pratt's "Determiner of Destiny" (see his *Religious Consciousness, passim*) which prejudges questions that need not be raised at this stage, when we are seeking to determine the general conditions of worship as such.

† The technical distinction assigns *dulia* to the saints in general, *hyperdulia* to our Lady, and *latria* to God alone.

and is given only to those who have extraordinary, supernatural qualities. Sacred animals have been worshipped in many parts of the world, but again only in their sacred association with some supernatural power, not in their character as animals. Further, the Object of worship must be regarded as real, not as a convenient fiction for arousing pious or edifying thoughts. As Dr. Pratt says, "subjective worship without some objective worship cannot stand,"* since it is self-delusion. The reality of the Object of worship need not necessarily be conceived of in personal terms, though on a general view of religion as a whole we discover a strongly marked tendency among mankind to worship more or less personalized Gods. Even when, as in Hinduism, the ultimate Reality is not personal, subordinate personal deities insinuate themselves into religious thought and practice; and when the ideas of *mana* and *numen* control any religious attitude, it is commonly due to the absence or imperfect development of the idea of personality as such.

At its maximum clearness, however, the Supernatural Real is known as the personal God of the Christian faith, and the "nature" of worship, according to the sound Aristotelian canon, is accordingly determined by the appropriate response of the human personality to the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Personality in God and man constitutes, as we have seen, a love-relationship. On man's side this relationship necessarily calls forth expression in active form as emotional release. Hence acts of worship, though in one sense a "supernatural" activity, are in another wholly "natural" to man. They can be described by either epithet, because the two levels of Nature and Supernature are distinct, but not separate. Supernature rises out of Nature and is continuous with it.

The moral supremacy of worship, considered as yet simply as a part of human experience, is at once manifest. The unique excellence and the absoluteness of the Object of worship impart high ethical quality to the activity of worship. The noblest function of the human spirit is to be with God consciously, to rejoice in His Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, to seek Him in penitence, thanksgiving, adoration and the manifold forms of communion with Him, and to be drawn by Him into willing co-operation with His purposes. If we sum up the precepts of the two Commandments of the gospel in the one word Charity—that twofold love of God and neighbour which constitutes Christian perfection—then Worship and Charity are the twin glories of our destiny. For, as a modern writer puts it, "the supreme means of attaining the perfection of charity and its exercise—a means indeed not disjoined from that end—is divine contempla-

* *Op. cit.*, p. 308. I return to this distinction below.

tion, or union with God through an experimental, loving and ineffable knowledge of Him, which we may all desire to receive from His Grace, and particularly through the assiduous practice of prayer."*

This conjunction of Worship and Charity is also in part accounted for by the psychological fact which we are next to consider, namely, the need of attention and the discipline of thought and will, if purpose and purity of motive are to be preserved. For reasons into which we need not enter here, there is, as is well known, an inherent weakness, a tendency to sag, in all human purposes. Enthusiasm and insight are rarely, if ever, commensurate with the demands made upon them by the circumstances of our life. The way of the idealist is hard and the price of progress is incessant watchfulness. "Video meliora . . . ," the old tag, is the commonplace of the moralist. It is a practical requirement of the moral life that the arduous task of maintaining spiritual ideals should be continuously pursued against the *vis inertiæ* of our fallen humanity. If, then, worship "in our lives" is to be preserved we need the practice of devotion; if only for the purpose of recall and renewal. The insistence on vocal prayer, set meditation, and other concrete religious exercises by even the most mystically inclined of spiritual writers is a point of great practical importance. All religiously awake souls have a sense of this need, however vigorously they may protest against conventional and formal religion. The temptation of a sophisticated mind is to prefer a general religious reference without devotional concreteness on popular lines. But to be content with a vague, general sense of God's existence is a dangerous dilution, not a purification, of religious practice. It is, as William Law says,† "equally prejudicial to true Religion" with that other extreme, which, "calling in too many outward means of worship, may degenerate into superstition." The general sense of God's presence does not dispense with, it requires, sacramental worship, the reading of the Bible and other spiritual books, and the practice of private prayer. The reading, say, of the Psalms not only expresses in concrete form our communion with God, it also renews and deepens it. It prevents it from fading out into something so filmy and inoperative that it ceases to have any real meaning or value. For the religious consciousness concrete devotional practices are only secondary in the sense of being sacramental. The good life, if religiously interpreted at all, cannot be conceived of as independent, with devotional practices as a pious "extra," or as an æsthetic pleasure for persons of a contemplative turn of mind. Rather, it retains its religious quality only so long as

* Maritain, *Prayer and Intelligence* (E.T.), p. 17. † *Serious Call*, p. 275.

it is penetrated throughout by the life-giving currents of devotion. Very few could continue for long to give any religious significance to the conduct of life in the absence of devotional practice of some definite kind. To make such an attempt would be to dehumanize religion. Religion would dwindle into an intolerably brainy, introverted caricature, for lack of the essentially human forms of expression in act and symbol. The place of ceremonial, for instance, in religious practice is no accident. The persistence of traditional rites and ceremonies is sometimes regarded by hostile psychological writers and higher religionists of various kinds as a merely unintelligible piece of conservatism, characteristic of the general irrationality of ordinary religion. Religious ceremonial certainly conforms to certain broad types throughout its history. But ceremonial as such is for religion the same humanly wholesome mode of expression as is painting or sculpture for art. The psychophysical constitution of man, when he is occupied about spiritual values, leads him to significant symbolism for the means of expression. Whether it be the elaborate interlacing of a multitude of ceremonial details, as in the richly embroidered pattern of a High Mass, or the studiously simple monochrome of the Quaker silence, there is the same essential fact: a ceremony is used as the vehicle for the interplay of invisible realities, human and divine. As long as the making of pictures and songs has interest for mankind, so long will men—and with like justification—turn to ceremonial symbolism in their religious lives.

IV.

We can now pass to the more formally ethical question to which the preceding considerations have been preparatory. So far worship has been approached psychologically, from the human end; and the analysis of worship as it appears in human experience has revealed certain points at which its ethical value emerges. It remains to bring it into relation with general ethical principles by asking the question, Does God require man's worship? In other words, we are to consider whether worship is not only something highly valuable to man's spiritual well-being, but also something owed to God, and therefore covered by the basic virtue of justice, failure in which leaves man not merely deficient, but morally culpable.

In the larger sense of a surrendered life worship is manifestly owed to God, since it is the purpose of man's creation that he should so live. The only possible moral corollary from the Christian doctrine of the creative and redemptive love of God, revealed in His purpose of an eternal Kingdom, is that man

should give voluntary allegiance to the purpose which infinite Wisdom and infinite Love has devised for him. Furthermore, even where there is involuntary—and therefore guiltless—ignorance of the Christian revelation, or conscientious inability to receive it, the law of God inscribed in conscience makes it morally obligatory to live by what light a man has, and so to glorify God. The absolute duty to live by what light one has does not mean the equality, *sub specie eternitatis*, of all creeds, or that it is a matter of indifference on what terms the duty of obedience to God is performed. A man is acceptable to God for his fidelity, but he is bound to receive new light as it comes. The same conscience that makes him, say, a faithful Jew may also lead him to abandon Judaism for Christianity. The eighteenth Article of Religion expresses a truth—though perhaps not the whole truth—when it anathematizes the opinion "that every man shall be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that Law, and the light of Nature." For it is demanded by the moral law that we should not wittingly fail to render to God what He requires of us. His will is made known supremely in the Christian revelation; and the less adequate approximations to the truth in any other "Law or Sect" cannot in themselves be of equal validity with Christianity. Those who through involuntary ignorance or conscientious inability to receive the Christian faith follow some other Law and the light of Nature, because it is all the truth they can see, are doubtless accepted of God; but it is not *because* of their "Law," still less through any equality, such as is sometimes alleged, of all creeds and religions.

However this may be, it remains true that, on the Christian or even on any religious hypothesis, the law of God must be the supreme guide of human life, and obedience to it the "bounden duty and service" of the creature to the Creator.

It is when we ask whether adoration in private prayer and in public worship is also pleasing to God and morally incumbent upon men that we enter on more debateable ground. In one of the best studies of the psychology of religion, Pratt's *Religious Consciousness*, the question is considered in terms of the author's distinction between "subjective" and "objective" worship.* Subjective worship he defines as that which "seeks only to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of the worshipper": objective worship "aims at making some kind of effect upon the Deity or in some way communicating with him." The first type, which Pratt finds predominant in Protestantism, seems to him to be unsatisfactory because it fails to preserve the essential character of religion as "conscious

* *Op. cit.*, p. 290.

relation to Cosmic Reality." He believes in the necessity for religion of "that union of awe and gratitude which is reverence, combined perhaps with consecration and a suggestion of communion, which most thoughtful men must feel in the presence of the Cosmic forces and in reflecting upon them." Such worship is not something to be outgrown as no longer possible for intelligent moderns, but is "as eternal as is man's finitude."

It is clear that all worship that is more than conscious autosuggestion will combine both forms in varying proportions. Pratt's suggestion is useful rather as drawing attention to the dual purpose of all worship than as distinguishing two independent forms of worship. There is, and must be, an objective reference, an attempt to enter into conscious relations with God; but it is also true that no worship is without effect on the worshipper, though the human value of the activity may not always be consciously in mind, and when it is desired and sought, must necessarily be found in contact with the Supernatural Real which is the object of worship.

Doubt has often been expressed about the ethical value of at least some forms of objective worship and in particular about the moral implications of the idea that God desires man's worship. Much in the history of religion reveals a deep-seated impulse in mankind to approach God with offerings, praises, and sacrifices of many kinds; and frequently these things have been given to God in the belief that God requires a tribute to His majesty, or that He needs to be propitiated, or that man must provide a *quid pro quo* if he is to expect divine favours. The dark history of human sacrifice provides, perhaps, the best evidence of the lengths to which men have gone in pursuance of these ideas. And we may say that the strongest reaction towards a predominantly subjective worship comes under the stress of the moral repugnance provoked by them: it is felt to be unworthy of God that He should be approached with flattery and cajolery. It has even been said that these ideas have gravely corrupted Christianity itself: they do not belong to the New Testament conception of God as the loving Father of men, but are a mere reflex of Oriental despotism, and are impossible for those who have emerged from primitive superstitions about monarchy: God is no irascible Sultan of uncertain temper and irresponsible moods, nor does He want the ceremonious attentions of the courtier.* The liberalism, political and theological, of the nineteenth century was in revolt against anything that seemed to conflict with the freedom and dignity of man; and where its influence has been strong, as in liberal Protestantism, the subjective emphasis observed by Pratt in American Pro-

* *Cf.* Anson in *Concerning Prayer*.

testantism, and equally observable in liberal Protestantism elsewhere, is readily intelligible. The new winds that are blowing through Protestantism from the neo-Calvinism of Barth may serve to redress the balance to some extent, since the rediscovery of the transcendence of God will have its effect on worship. Meanwhile, it seems to us clear that in the Catholic tradition of spirituality, though excess and extravagance in devotional language and feeling are not wanting in many passages in the great mass of writing on the subject, we have the materials with which to construct a balanced conception of worship, objective and subjective, and also a fully moralized view of objective worship.

There are two main types of worship in the Catholic tradition, each having an objective and a subjective reference, but in varying proportion. The first type, mainly objective in character, is found in the Eucharist and in the choir offices, the *opus Dei* or "divine service"; the second, mainly subjective, is found in meditation and mental prayer. Historic Christianity, through centuries of use of both types, has evolved a grandly complete scheme of worship. The Eucharistic sacrifice looks towards God, bringing Christ, and, mystically united with Christ in His Body, the persons of the worshippers to the Father, as the perfect gift of dedicated life. The divine office is more meditative in character, but is still clearly objective, the tribute of grateful and loving reverence, nourished as well as expressed by the recitation of the psalter and other scriptures, and leading on to petitions and intercessions. Both acts of worship have also their subjective value. In the act of Communion the Divine giver and the receiving soul meet in an ineffable interaction. Apart from communion, "a church in which mass is being said is an excellent place to pray," as Dr. Pratt truly observes. Nor can we leave without mention the subjective effect of the solemn rite, the ordered ceremonial, whether at a low mass with its subdued dignity or in the splendours of high mass, and the beauty and peace of a well-furnished church and sanctuary. In divine service the subjective element appears in the discursive and reflective character of the main body of the services, composed as they are of scriptural materials; whereas the Eucharist is primarily an action, the choir offices are more closely akin to meditation. In meditation or mental prayer itself edification and growth in spiritual insight and knowledge have a large place, though the objective reference is not lacking, since a meditation properly ends with acts of self-oblation and thanksgiving, and will be interspersed throughout with objective acts of worship of many kinds. The ordered life of Catholic devotion along these lines of Eucharistic worship, the office, and

meditation, which has become the normal practice of the clergy, the religious orders and the devout laity, may seem to an outside observer too much of a system and a routine for the delicate and elusive spirit of prayer. But quite apart from the rare fruits of holiness which it produces, those who attempt to practise it with intelligence and humility discover how flexible and how capable of endless personal application it is. And this is largely due to the range and balance of its underlying principles.

It has been necessary to refer thus briefly to the nature of Catholic devotional practice, with its full and frank inclusion of both objective and subjective emphases in worship, in order that the theory to which we now turn may not hang in the air.

The theory is stated by St. Thomas Aquinas with a simplicity and brevity that cannot be bettered. Pure objectivity might seem to be implied in such a statement as this: "Deo debetur reverentia propter ejus excellentiam."* But we get also such statements as these: "Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus, non propter seipsum, quia ex seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adjici potest, sed propter nos, quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur et honoramus, mens nostra ei subjicitur: et in hoc ejus perfectio consistit";† or again, "Deum non laudamus propter utilitatem suam sed propter utilitatem nostram."‡

These quotations express, in admirably pregnant sentences, the true *rationale* of worship. In the first place, there is the natural and proper reverence for all that is true and good and beautiful, and in a special degree for God, the ground of all values. Honour, as St. Thomas says elsewhere, is owed to someone *ratione excellentiæ*.§ Here is an incontrovertible deliverance of the moral consciousness, which hardly needs argument. Such a debt is owed by man from his moral nature as a being capable of discerning spiritual value, and failure to pay it is a moral failure. St. Thomas expresses this truth when, in speaking of the relation between religion and the virtues, he says, "religio inter virtutes enumeratur . . . quod reddere debitum alicui habet rationem boni."‖ Religion, as we said above, is morality; or, in the more precise words of St. Thomas, "it is preeminent among the other moral virtues."¶ Our devotional acts are the concrete acts, suited to the dual nature of man, whose spiritual attitude needs bodily expression, whereby we acknowledge and in part render our debt. This is no grovelling before a capricious Sultan; it is the fulfilment of the noblest function of a spiritual being, and is demanded by God because God is the ground of the moral law. For, in the second place, God's claim

* *Summa Theologica*, II.ª II.ªe, Q. lxxxiv., Art. 1.
‡ *Ibid.*, Q. xci., Art. 1.
‖ *Ibid.*, Q. lxxxi., Art. 2.
† *Ibid.*, Q. lxxxi., Art. 7.
§ *Ibid.*, Q. lxxxi., Art. 4.
¶ *Ibid.*, Q. lxxxi., Art. 6.

is the claim of His Goodness, which is His love, and seeks only the welfare of His children. He does not seek His glory for His own sake, but for ours. In any case, even if *per impossibile* He wished it, He could gain nothing comparable to the sense of gratification felt by men who receive the praise of their fellows. But to glorify God is to bring our minds into harmony with His perfect will, wherein, as St. Thomas puts it, their perfection consists. There is, accordingly, a twofold ethical rhythm in the life of worship. It flows out towards God in recognition of His unique excellence, which is the rendering of our just due as well as our joy; but its flow is controlled by the value for human life and for its ethical perfecting which the activity of worship possesses. The objective and subjective aspects of worship are not independent entities, but the warp and woof of a web which maintains its existence only by their union.

V.

Two other features of objective worship still need consideration from the ethical point of view before we can be satisfied of its general moral validity. We shall consider these in particular because of their prevalence and importance in the religious life of historic Christianity and the frequency with which they are impugned on ethical grounds. They are the element of self-abasement and the sacrificial element in worship.

That the language of devotion has been full of self-abasement hardly needs illustration. From St. Paul to the Curé d'Ars even the most eminent Christians have called themselves the chief of sinners, and the pursuit of humility has been carried to extravagant lengths almost in proportion to the high and heroic sanctity of those who followed after it. Great men and great saints, like St. Francis of Assisi and St. Philip Neri, seem to have gone out of their way to court undeserved humiliation and to have rejoiced in nothing so much as being scorned and misunderstood. Again, the public worship of the rank and file of Christendom has been strongly marked by language expressive of the sense of sin and wretchedness—language which is often objected to, as wholly excessive by comparison with the real feelings of those who use it in church. Modern writers have attacked what has been called the "sin obsession" as un-Christian and unwholesome, and the doubts they may awaken are reinforced by the psychological evidence (notably in the work of Dr. Adler) of the disintegrating effect of the sense of inferiority. But the problem is not only a modern problem. The "once-born" has always felt not only surprise but also moral indignation at "twice-born" mentality. Pelagian and

Augustinian confront each other with doubtful and uncomprehending eyes on many a page of the history of the human soul.

It may be said at once that the element of self-abasement has frequently appeared not merely in romantically extravagant but even in perilous forms. Few would care to defend wholeheartedly all that the great ascetics have said and done for the greater glory of God. More dangerous still is that dark streak which appears sometimes in the great Augustine and widens to form the basis of Jansenist and Calvinist doctrines. Quietism with its enervating mood of limp surrender and Islamic perversions of the transcendence doctrine are other obvious products in religious history of a corrupt sense of the spiritual capacity and moral dignity of men.

Some reaction against these pathological religious states is both natural and morally necessary. Yet two things should be equally obvious. The first is that a prosy literalism in interpreting the language with which great souls have expressed their deepest experiences is deplorably Philistine. And the second is that in the cool light of reason the moral judgment must accept as veridical the sense of sin and unworthiness springing from a worshipping soul's vivid realization of the holiness of God. Such self-abasement is no more than an acknowledgment of fact. Man makes himself ridiculous if he is on his dignity with God, or democratizes his relations with his Maker. Man's relation to the Eternal Reality is unique. There is nothing parallel to it in his experience, and what applies in all other relations gives place here to a simple one-way dependence, that of the creature on the Creator. Moreover, when we have said "creature" we have said by no means all. We must add "sinner" if we are to do justice not only to the massive facts of general human experience and the world as it is, but also to the impressive unanimity of Christian experience, not least in these elect souls who have gone furthest in the knowledge and love of God. Worship leaves room for these realities of human life when it freely admits self-abasement and penitent humility. It truly mirrors the absolute dependence and the sinfulness of men when it veils its face before the absolute and flawless wisdom and holiness of God, and confesses the nothingness of man in the presence of Eternal Love and Truth. Nor does this in any way detract from the confidence we have in approaching our Father. It is difficult to believe that religious souls have ever felt any real clash in the actual experience of worship. It is only when we try to compress that experience into the ready-made categories of a thoroughly unimaginative logic that we forget the subtle and rich complexity of living religion. The religion that dotes

on the twenty-third psalm and feels shocked by the *Miserere* and the *De Profundis* is the sentimentality of Quality Street, not the many-sided reality of Christian worship, wherein the sinful creature does not forget his sin and his creatureliness while he rejoices in his redemption and enters with boldness into the holy place. The test, as always, is the test of life. It has often been observed that, in the great men and women of Christendom, an unusually deep sense of humility and unworthiness, so far from enervating and demoralizing personality, has been matched by an almost superhuman vigour, a capacity for moral effort and heroic achievement that has astonished the world. We have already mentioned St. Francis of Assisi and the saintly Curé d'Ars; and they are but two familiar instances of what could be found throughout the length and breadth of Christendom in any age, among Catholics and also among Protestants.

We turn next to sacrifice. The offering of sacrifice to God has been a prominent feature of worship throughout the history of religion. It has been included in the Christian religion, as a central and highly honoured element, in the sacrificial worship of the Holy Eucharist. The Eucharist depends for its meaning on a sacrificial evaluation of the life and death of Christ. Historic Christianity has been, and is, a religion of redemption wrought by an atoning sacrifice, and the *lex orandi* has accordingly mirrored the sacrificial character of the *lex credendi*.

The ethical difficulties raised by the question whether God desires man's worship are perhaps felt by the modern mind most of all in connection with the idea of sacrifice. These difficulties might be summarized in some such words as these: "Animal sacrifice is an obsolete and repugnant barbarism. And not only the repulsive fact of the slaughtered victim and the blood-stained shrine, but also the underlying idea of sacrificial rites is both futile and immoral. It involves the notion that God can be placated by gifts: it springs from primitive credulity and fear; and these notions are incompatible with any but the most rudimentary ideas of God. The prophet's statement that God desires mercy not sacrifice is the clear voice of ethical religion. The presence of even sacrificial analogy in the Christian doctrine of the atonement and in Christian worship is to be deplored, and the whole attitude implied in the Epistle to the Hebrews has no more than historical interest. Christianity was hampered through all its formative period by the sacrificial system of the Judaism from which it sprang. Even though it threw over that system, the *damnosa hereditas* of its ideas survived to give an unethical and unspiritual twist to the interpretation of the Christian facts and the Christian experience. In the interest of ethical religion they should therefore be abandoned altogether.

What has the God of love to do with the reeking horrors of temple sacrifice ?"

Common though it is in modern thinking, this refusal to accept sacrifice as a religious category fails to satisfy for two main reasons. It lacks any sense of history, which is vital for any adequate comprehension of Christianity; and it is vitiated by a widespread misunderstanding of the nature and meaning of sacrifice.

The first point may be dismissed briefly. Christianity is a historical religion, rooted in a particular past. It is not the formulation of an abstract theism evolved from the inner consciousness of speculative thinkers. The very centre of the gospel of Jesus, the Kingdom of God, is an idea which had had a long history before He remoulded it and brought it to its perfect form. If the gospels are to be taken as trustworthy at all, nothing is more certain than that the idea of sacrifice was the one that He Himself adopted to express the meaning of His death in the service of the Kingdom. The new covenant in His body and blood, made at the Last Supper, depends for its meaning on the sacrificial ideas which for a Jew were inseparable from the old covenant now superseded. It was not by a clean sweep of existing religion and the construction of a new religion *in vacuo* that Jesus proclaimed His message and did His work. Rather He willed to employ the religious ideas of His people—the ideas, for instance, of the Kingdom, the Messiah, the Elect Race, the Covenant—as the basis of His teaching. All were transformed and purified; but He seems to have chosen deliberately the risk of misunderstanding, even among His intimate circle of followers, rather than cut Himself entirely from the religious past, and inscribe His own message on a *tabula rasa*. It would be presumptuous to expatiate on the wisdom of this procedure. It is enough to say that the Christianity of Christ had no hesitation in using the ideas of a religion in which animal sacrifice was an essential part, and, what is more, in employing the very sacrificial content of that religion to express the meaning of its own culmination on the Cross.

The meaning of that sacrificial content is often gravely misunderstood. This is not the place in which to examine in detail the significance of the Old Testament sacrifices. It is the less necessary since the subject has been reopened, and discussed with admirable penetration, by the Bishop of Gibraltar in his book, *The Fullness of Sacrifice*. He points out that the common error of concentrating on the death of the victim as the characteristic feature of sacrifice has led to radical misconceptions of the purpose of sacrifice. The truth is that in the sin- and guilt-offerings of the Law, "it is not the death that atones, but the

life (Lev. xvii. 11). The death is vital to the sacrifice because it sets free the blood, which is the life."* Again, "just as in the sin-offering the characteristic feature is not the death of the victim but the liberation of its life, so in the burnt-offering the significance lies not in its destruction but in its transformation,"† and the peace-offering—probably the oldest of the Hebrew sacrifices—"is inseparably bound up with the idea of praise and thanksgiving." The essential meaning of sacrifice is thus expressed: "Cost is the essential of sacrifice; and with all the failures of the Old Testament system, alike by historical precedent and by sacrificial rule, there is a sense in which man, in offering, offers himself."‡ "Life, in the death of the sacrificial victim, was not ended, but surrendered, and surrendered in order that it might be accepted, and, in acceptance, lifted from its earthly limitations into full association with God in heaven. It is precisely this lifting of the earthly into the heavenly that is presented to us in the Synoptic Gospels."§

These quotations are sufficient to suggest the profoundly ethical and spiritual ideas which, with whatever crudity and imperfection, lie at the root of the Jewish sacrifices. And if it be objected—in our judgment, unjustifiably objected—that this view reads into these sacrifices a spiritual content which, historically and in fact, they did not possess at the time and in the minds of those who offered them, there is a further consideration that must be borne in mind. The true "nature" of a thing is only to be found when it reaches its full maturity. Origin must not be confused with validity, nor is the final flowering of an idea to be set aside in favour of its rude beginnings, when we seek its essential significance and value for thought and life. At the very least sacrifice is *capable* of meaning the loftiest of spiritual truths, namely, that only as man surrenders himself to be used and transformed by the Infinite Love and Wisdom of God does he fulfil his moral end. Now this is precisely what Jesus Christ did. And it needs above all things to be remembered that the true meaning of sacrifice is, for the Christian, to be found only in Christ. Animal sacrifice is imperfect sacrifice. But it points to the idea which found perfect expression in Christ. The surrender to God of the dedicated will, that it may be transformed by Him for His purposes—the sacrifice perfectly exemplified in the life and death of Christ—is anticipated in the offering of the blood of an animal, wherein its life was supposed to consist, as in a way representing the offerer. If we are historically minded—and to some extent we must be to grasp the philosophy of the

* *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
† *Op. cit.*, p. 19.
‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 24.
§ *Op. cit.*, p. 175.

Christian faith—we shall see the process from the primitive and undeveloped stages to the fullness of sacrifice in the Lamb of God with a reverent understanding of the divine training of man's spirit. We shall neither find animal sacrifice merely repugnant nor dream of using for ourselves the idea of sacrifice except in the full meaning that it has reached in Christ. If the nature of sacrifice is determined by its perfected form, then the sacrifice of the Cross shows the true meaning of sacrifice, as the self-giving of a consecrated will in loving obedience to God at the cost, if need be, of suffering and death. Death of the body in itself is not necessary for the perfection of sacrifice: as St. Bernard says, "non mors sed voluntas morientis" is the crucial point in the atoning sacrifice of Christ.

In other words, sacrifice is the means whereby we translate into action the central ethical principle of Christianity, the principle of gain through loss: he that loses his life shall save it. The ethical significance of the sacrificial worship of the Eucharist —and in their degree of all acts of Christian worship—emerges directly from the very heart of the Christian ethic. In the Eucharistic sacrifice the Christian makes an offering of his own imperfect will and purpose in union with the perfect will and purpose of Christ. By so doing he secures two supremely desirable ethical ends. He makes the offering of his own life for the purposes of God; it is an act of love, answering the greater Love of God, and it is the fulfilment of the moral end of man. But he does it, not in any blind submission to an unknown God nor yet with any complacency about his own value and importance. All fatalism, with all mere naturalism, disappears when the Christian worshipper "loses" himself in union with Christ, and so (and so only) offers a flawless obedience to the perfect will of God. Not any obedience will do. Love seeks to give a perfect offering. So it is that the dual nature of the Eucharist, sacrament as well as sacrifice, works towards a single end. The second of these purposes, that of union with Christ and the offering of a flawless obedience, is progressively achieved by the grace of which the sacrament is a means. *Ex opere operato non opponentibus obicem*—so the old scholastic phrase runs—the sacrament enables the sacrifice to be made. The sacrifice is the worship of communicants, even though the act of communion be not made by all the worshippers on every occasion when the Holy Sacrifice is offered. It is as growing in grace and the practice of virtue that they offer an acceptable worship.

Little need be added on the ethical significance of the central place which the *death* of Christ holds in the faith and worship of Christendom. For the Christian faith and for the worship of the Eucharist Calvary is the focal point where re-

demptive obedience and love shine at their brightest intensity. In relation to God the Cross is the climax, in the temporal order, of the eternal self-offering of the Son to the Father: in relation to man it is the supreme point reached by the redemptive love of the Son of man, since greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends. It is true that physical death in itself has no significance. In the words of St. Bernard already quoted, not the death but the will of him who dies has significance. Obedience *unto death* is the obedience exacted by a sinful world. Yet at the same time death, as the sacrifices of the old law dimly implied, is release. The Christ who goes through the grave and gate of death is the Christ who ascends to the right hand of God, released from the limitations of earthly life, to continue His work for the salvation of mankind. The worship of the Church, by presenting the death of Christ in the Eucharist, is able to include the profoundly ethical thought of the life not only surrendered but also transformed, which, as Dr. Hicks shows, explains the emphasis on the blood sprinkled about the altar in Old Testament sacrifices.

This ethical conception of sacrifice has been outlined in relation to the subject of this essay, and it is not put forward as a comprehensive account of the doctrine of the Atonement. But its bearing upon that doctrine, and upon the moral difficulties which are often supposed to spring from it, will be apparent. Such a conception of sacrifice leaves ample room for an "objective" Atonement theory, and at the same time it does not seem open to the moral objections which have given rise to the various "subjective" theories from Abelard to Rashdall. It also clears the historic worship of Christendom from the suspicion of being unethical in connecting its highest act with a sacrificial interpretation of Calvary and even with those propædeutic sacrifices of the old Law. It does more. The ethical significance of worship meets its most searching test when the sacrificial element is put on trial. And unless we are wholly mistaken in our analysis, it is precisely here, in its sacrificial aspect, that worship reaches heroic heights and finds its triumphant vindication as the supreme moral activity of the soul of man.

HENRY BALMFORTH.

MODES OF EPISCOPAL ELECTION

THE present system, 303 years old, began in 1534, when nominations to the Pope ceased. Since then, when a vacancy occurs the Dean and Chapter notify the Crown and pray for

permission to proceed to an election. The Crown grants a licence, called *congé d'élire*, under the Great Seal to the Dean and Chapter, together with a Letter Missive containing the name of the person they must elect. If they do not elect him within twelve days, the Crown can by Letters Patent, that is open letters addressed "to all to whom these presents shall come," nominate any person it thinks fit. But if the Dean and Chapter carry out their orders and return the name to the Crown as duly elected, the Metropolitan is then required by Letters Patent to confirm the appointment and complete it canonically.

It must strike everyone that this election by the Dean and Chapter is a legal fiction. And so Edward VI. declared it to be. He dispensed with this form of election and made his appointments straightway by Letters Patent. The reason given was that "the said elections be in very deed no elections, but only by a writ of *congé d'élire* having colours, shadows or pretences of elections, serving nevertheless to no purpose.

It is argued in defence of the present system that it has worked well, that the King and his Ministers have acted for the interests of the Church and State at all events for the past fifty years (we say nothing of the previous 250 years). They have given us good men as bishops, and sometimes the best possible —but not always.

This is the point for our consideration. In what way could we change the present system so as to be always as sure, as humanly speaking we could be, of obtaining on every occasion the best possible man under present circumstances while we are a State Church? Moreover, when altering the present system or substituting for it an entirely new system for our present condition, it would be wise to have in view a possible alteration of that condition in the future, and accordingly to direct our efforts to drawing up a scheme, which, with the least possible modification of its machinery, could be adjusted to any contemplated change of our condition—such as disestablishment.

The election of a bishop of a diocese, who is a bishop of the Catholic or Universal Church, and also an official of the State, is no simple matter. It is complicated because of the several interests that have to be safeguarded, and should both legally and spiritually be considered. To quote Leo, Bishop of Rome, A.D. 440: "One who is to preside over all must be elected by all."* This is only fair. As bishops are officers of the whole Church they should be elected by the whole Church. The interests of the whole Church of England, not those of a section, must, therefore, be safeguarded in these elections.

* "Qui præfuturus est omnibus ab omnibus eligatur," *Ep.* 89.

Firstly, the laity must have a voice. In the earliest days they had a powerful voice in the election of their spiritual officers. It was "the body" of the disciples who "elected" the deacons (Acts. vi. 2). The apostles confirmed the nominations. The "men brethren" nominated St. Matthias to fill the place of an apostle (Acts. i. 15 f.). The apostles appear to have carried out the concluding portion of the proceedings—the confirmation. Afterwards the apostles appear to have appointed. Polycarp was appointed by the apostles as Bishop of Smyrna (Irenæus, iii. 3. 3, Tertullian, *Præscr.* 32). After their decease the appointments, according to their regulation (for they knew there would be strife over the name of the bishop's office), were made "by other men of repute with the consent of the whole Church" (Clement of Rome, i. 44). Clement (Alex.)* states that St. John appointed bishops. It would seem, then, that after apostolic days bishops were elected by the whole body of clergy and laity, and that in the days of metropolitans they and the provincial bishops were the confirming authority.

Some writers would explain away the powers of the laity, Benson (*Cyprian*, p. 28) going so far as to evacuate the word *suffragium*, when used in connection with the laity, of any real meaning. But, on the other hand, Cyprian† has recorded that Cornelius was made Bishop of Rome (A.D. 233) "by the testimony of nearly all the clergy and the suffrage of the laity then present." Theodoret‡ says: "The Bishops, Clergy and all the laity by a common vote compelled Eustathius to become bishop of Antioch" (A.D. 325). He also says§ that Lucius the Arian had not been chosen by "a synod or orthodox bishops, or the vote of the genuine clergy, or by the petition of the laity, as the laws of the Church ordain."‖ Socrates declares that Chrysostom was chosen Bishop of Constantinople "by the common vote of all together, clergy and laity." Gregory Nazianzen states that Athanasius was elected "by the suffrage of the whole people"¶ (326). It was an old principle that was stated by Celestine I., Bishop of Rome (423), that "no bishop should be forced upon those unwilling to receive him."** He also says in the same letter that the consent and wish of the clergy, the laity, and the "ordo" should be obtained. The question is whether "ordo" means the episcopal order or the civil power, as Du Pin takes it. At all events, the Fourth Council of Carthage (398) ordered that four consents were requisite for a valid consecration—the clergy, the laity, the provincial bishops, and the metropolitan.

* Euseb., *H.E.* iii, 23 (Q.D.S.). † *Ep.* 52. ‡ Book I., 7.
§ Book IV., 22. ‖ Book VI., 2. ¶ *Orat.* xxi. 8.
** *Ep.* II., c. 5: "Nullis invitis detur episcopus."

In the meantime there were complaints that the people were becoming somewhat unruly at these elections. Justinian deprived the inferior laity of the right of voting, restricting it to those of rank and position. He decreed that the clergy and the chief citizens should meet and nominate three persons, swearing upon the gospel that they were acting without bribe or favour. One of these three was then to be elected by the presiding bishop.* In the East, popular elections died out before they did in the West. The Council of Constantinople (869) twenty-second canon, forbade the interference of the laity in these elections, but in the Roman Church the laity and clergy continued to elect until the Pontificate of Innocent II. (1130-1143). Van Espen† says Celestine II. was the first Pope chosen without the intervention of the people. It is stated‡ also that it had become the general rule from the twelfth century that Bishops should be chosen by the cathedral chapters "as representing the clergy." Hardwick§ quotes the pronouncement of Innocent II. in 1215 that "he should be elected upon whom all or the greater part of the saner (*sanior*) part of the chapter agreed." Before that the right of assent had been allowed to *spiritales et religiosi viri*. But the rights of the laity were finally and completely taken away by an edict of Gregory IX. (1227-1241).

A word now about the intervention of the State. Ever since the Church became allied to the State the emperors had claimed the right of approval and confirmation in the case of the more important sees. Sozomen (viii. 2) says that Chrysostom was chosen bishop with the approval (*συνήνει*) of the emperor, having been already, as Socrates states, chosen "by the common vote of all, clergy and laity" (vi. 2).

Here is a lead for us. If we could reverse the order of the present system and restore the election of the bishop to the clergy and laity and give the confirming voice to the Crown, we would be acting in accordance with one historical method. Relations with the State from the days of Athanasius complicated matters. The Church had to be protected against palace influences which were exerted in favour of imperial candidates. One of the so-called apostolical canons (xxix.) virtually excommunicated all bishops who owed their position to court influence, and their associates with them. But this abuse went on gathering pace and volume in spite of the clamours of councils that only elections made with the consent of the metropolitan, his conprovincial bishops and the clergy and laity of the *civitas* were valid (as that of Paris A.D. 615 and Rheims A.D. 625). The Frankish bishops, however, did not give in without a struggle.

* *Novel.* 123, c. 1.
† I. xiii., 1.
‡ Fra Paolo, *Treatise of Benefices*, c. 24.
§ *Middle Ages*, p. 256, note 5.

Hardwick says: "Under Charlemagne and the rest of the Carlovingian princes, who were anxious to revive the canons of the early Church, the efforts of the Frankish prelates to regain their independence were more uniformly carried out. The freedom of episcopal elections was, at least in words, conceded, and the Church was not unwilling in her turn to grant a confirmatory power to the Sovereign."* On some such lines, with the necessary variations, by which the freedom of the Church might be made at least a respectable reality, the present system could be amended with much advantage to the Church and no discourtesy to the Crown or State.

It was in Charlemagne's day that the feudal practice of investiture began, the newly elected or nominated bishop being presented with a ring and staff in token of the spiritual powers entrusted to him. It was this claim on the part of the State to dispose of spirituals which led to the spirited resistance of Hildebrand (Gregory VII., 1073–1080) and his successors to the kings and emperors. Both parties, the Pope and the Sovereign, contended for the right of nomination and decision in contested elections. They made concordats which they did not intend to keep. Eventually the popes won. Hallam† says: "From the pontificate of Innocent III. (1209) the Papal jurisdiction over such controversies became thoroughly recognized. The popes soon assumed not only a right of decision but of devolution, that is of supplying the want of election or the unfitness of the elected by a nomination of their own." This was done in the case of Stephen Langton and other archbishops who were provided by the Pope. Besides the *jus devolutionis* they had also a *jus præventionis*, claiming patronage in all cases of translation, which they took care were frequent, and of bishops who died at the Roman court. As the Romans ruled in Britain until A.D. 418, it is probable that the same method of election that prevailed in the Empire up to that date obtained in Roman Britain, that is election by the clergy and laity of the district and the neighbouring bishops, with confirmation by the princes.

Cyprian (*Ep.* lxv. 5) says that one of the requisites of a proper election in Africa was the choice of the neighbouring bishops, *episcopi ejusdem provinciæ proximi*. Here we have another interest that must be safeguarded. The bishops as a body must be interested in the election of a bishop. They must therefore be allowed the right of saying whether a certain person proposed is fully qualified to take his seat among them, by his spirituality, culture, education, and general soundness of theological views and life.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 56 f.

† *Middle Ages*, II., 212 (twelfth edition).

Writing of the Anglo-Saxon Church, Lingard says: "The vague and doubtful language of the authorities throws but little light on the subject, sometimes describing the appointment as made by the unfettered choice of the Clergy and People, and sometimes as proceeding solely from the absolute will of the Sovereign. The probability is that both were conjoined, that the recommendation of the prince operated as a command; while the election of the clergy and people was a form preliminary to the confirmation and consecration of the Prelate-Elect." He goes on to say that "the descendants of Egbert appeared to have disposed of the most important sees in national Councils, and with the consent of the Bishops and Ealdormen"—that is,* with the consent of the Witan.

However, Canute and his successors, who introduced investiture with ring and crozier, nominated court favourites in an arbitrary manner. Ingulf,† Abbot of Crowland, is quoted by Burn as his authority for the statement that "for many years past there had been no canonical election of Prelates, for that they were donative by delivery of the ring and pastoral staff." Ingulf lived in the reign of William I. Anselm, however, refused to consecrate bishops so invested by Henry I., who had to submit and leave the election to the Chapters, reserving homage for himself in respect of temporalities. The claims of the Crown to nominate were further weakened by John's charter granting "that the elections of all Anglia should be free." In an attempt to win over the bishops to his side he confirmed the right of the Church to elect its bishops subject to his licence and approval, "neither of which was to be withheld without just cause" (November, 1214). Stubbs‡ goes on to say: "This Charter of John may be regarded as the fullest and final recognition of the canonical right which had been maintained as the common law of the Church ever since the Conquest . . . which the Crown, however often it evaded it, did not henceforth attempt to override."

From 1214 to 1534, however, the Pope was the offender. He used his right of confirmation in a tyrannical way, and often discovered a way of disqualifying the choices of the cathedral chapters, and, as Burn § says, "neither was he content with this power only of confirmation and consecration but would oftentimes collate to the Bishoprics himself." He was somewhat checked by the Statute of Provisors (A.D. 1351), which aimed at restoring the rights of collation enjoyed by the Crown before free elections were granted, and preventing the papal provisions for bishoprics and benefices not yet vacant, and also by the

* *Hist. of Anglo-Saxon Church*, i., 85.
† Burn, *Eccl. Law*, 1, 179.
‡ *Constitutional History*, iii., pp. 303-304.
§ *Eccl. Law*, I., p. 181.

great Statute of Præmunire (1392), which forbade the introduction of Papal Bulls into England.

Both Provisors and Præmunire were at times evaded; but they frequently served to check papal interference in episcopal elections and the usurpation of patronage. Finally, papal authority over the Church of England was crushed once and for ever, we trust, by the Act 25 Henry VIII., *c.* 20, which forbade all nominations and presentations to the Bishop of Rome for the office of an archbishop or bishop in England.

Therefore when considering the rights to be safeguarded in the election of English or Anglican bishops, we need not take into account those of the Bishop of Rome, whose intrusion was a lucrative usurpation. But it should be pointed out that it was the Crown that gained by the repudiation of the papal authority, and not the newly liberated Church, and that in all fairness to the Church the mode of election that obtained before the days of princely despotism in England should be restored. Henry, however, was head of the Church and also head of the State. The present arrangement was, consequently, the work of an absolute monarch, and absolutism has since died a natural death in England. To suggest an alteration of this scheme which by a legal fiction left the shadow of an election with the chapters which they dared not carry out without incurring the penalties of Præmunire, while retaining the substance in his own hands, is not to show disloyalty to the Crown which has far worthier representatives in Egbert and his successors, in whose days the bishops and nobles (ealdormen) were consulted in the Witenagemot by the prince. The main lines of that system might be restored without prejudice to the Crown or State. A representative Board of Bishops and Nobles might be established on the elective principle and consulted by a royal commissioner. That the present system, based as it is on a legal fiction which gives the Church the simulacrum of power, while retaining the reality for the minister, has worked as well as it has during the last fifty years, which at all events have been free from previous unseemly conflicts over the episcopal elections between monarch and minister, is not due to its inherent excellences, but is in spite of its inherent defects. It is inconsistent that a minister who might be an atheist or agnostic or dissenter, or be otherwise disqualified, and who represents a party and not the State, should have the sole voice in the nomination of a bishop of the Holy Catholic Church, which practically created the State. A man who might be morally or spiritually unfit, as some ministers have been, and may be in the future, to receive the sacrament himself is to be regarded as morally and spiritually fit to nominate one who is to be consecrated to ordain men to administer that

most holy sacrament. This is not only a most grievous wrong to the Church, its laity, clergy and bishops, but an illogical, unnatural, unreasonable and paradoxical state of affairs.

A suggestion has been made in this paper of a system whereby these glaring inconsistencies might be removed, and their legal rights restored to those in whom the election of a bishop is vested by every law of God and every just law of man. Something more on these lines remains to be said. Turn for a moment to the Disestablished Church of Ireland. See how its system works. The bishops are there elected in open synod by duly elected laymen and by all the clergy of the diocese, voting by orders, and in the proportion of one clergyman to two laymen, which practically leads to the same numbers. There is no election, however, unless one name obtains the support of a two-thirds majority of both orders. If the diocese fails to elect, the choice lapses to the Bench of Bishops, who nearly always elect some name not voted for at the election, thus preserving the interests of the Church. This scheme was an experiment. It worked tolerably well for a time, but has not given general satisfaction. Between 1872 and 1909, thirty-seven years, there were thirty elections, seventeen of which were made by the synods electing by a majority of two-thirds of both orders, and the remaining thirteen were made by the bishops. The dioceses were inclined to elect a diocesan man, and the bishops an outsider. In later years it has become increasingly difficult for the laity and clergy to agree upon any one man as bishop; but not so difficult to agree to refer the matter to the bishops, who have not seldom preferred the laity's choice to the clergy's, probably for this reason that the clerical vote is not altogether disinterested. Looking at the results of the first thirty elections, we note an increasing tendency to refer the matter to the bishops. Of the first ten appointments only two were made by the bishops, of the second ten four, and of the last ten seven, were referred to the Bench. This shows a growing desire to free the election from diocesan limitations.

The system has given the Church of Ireland pious and highly respectable men, many of whom have been more remarkable for business capacity than for learning or churchmanship, even if it sometimes gets a d'Arcy or a Bernard. The election is intended to be a popular election, but the most popular man does not always make the best bishop. The best men had been so often passed over that there was a strong desire publicly expressed in 1909 for some improvement of the system by the most eminent and enlightened lay synodsmen, who were the best judges of the working of the scheme. Accordingly, it

would not do for the Church of England ever to contemplate such a system, much less the Scottish, American, or Colonial systems, which are not even as satisfactory as the Irish.

The Roman Catholic method is quite different. The laity are excluded. The parish priests elect three names arranged in order as "dignus," "dignior," "dignissimus," and the Pope selects one of the three.

Having considered and found wanting various methods of election of bishops, one might suggest, without offence to any, a method for election here which would safeguard all the real, legal, and spiritual interests involved.

(1) Firstly, take the Diocesan Conference with its lay and clerical representatives of the diocese duly elected. A Board might be elected by the Conference from its members, consisting of two laymen and two priests with supplementalists, every third year, and called the Nomination Board of the Diocese.

(2) Secondly, in the Church Assembly we have lay and clerical representatives duly elected of the whole Church. A second Board, consisting of two laymen and two priests with supplementalists, might be elected every third year from and by the Assembly, which might be called the Nomination Board of the Church.

(3) Thirdly, in the House of Lords we have lay and spiritual peers, a combined representation of the best and most permanent interests in the State. A third Board consisting of two bishops and two lay peers might be elected with supplementalists every third year, to be called the Nomination Board of the State.

There is an early precedent for placing the peers of the realm upon such a Board. Leo the Great (440-461) spoke of the decision of nobles in the election of a bishop as "honoratorum arbitrium, electio clericorum" (*Ep.* 89). Justinian would only allow the principal men of the city to take part in the election of a bishop. Their reason is obvious. Educated men were better qualified to judge the work and relative merits of the candidates. Now, in the event of a vacancy occurring the joint Boards consisting of twelve men, six clergy and six laity, should look round the whole Church and consider the most suitable man, not only for the office, but also for the see and the Church, and if they failed after a given time to come to any agreement or to give a two-thirds majority to any name proposed, voting by orders, they should refer the matter to the Bench of Bishops, on which of course the two bishops who had already voted should not sit.

The bishops would then have to consider the matter among themselves. Owing to the various schools of thought represented, they would find it more difficult to come to an agreement

than the Irish Bench. However, there is a lot of give and take in such affairs, and they would eventually agree to give a majority of votes to some one name. Then that name should be sent up for confirmation to the Crown.

The advantage of this scheme is this, that it could be easily adapted to a change of our condition or status made by an alteration of our relation to the State, by dropping the Board that represents the State and making the two archbishops the confirming authority. Another advantage is that it safeguards the rights of all the parties concerned at present in the election, the laity and clergy of the diocese, the laity and clergy of the Church, the bishops and the State.

In the meantime, as the Church is defended by Act of Parliament from a Roman Catholic minister's interference in its elections (Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1829), it ought to be protected from a Nonconformist's nomination of its bishops. As the Crown has surrendered its right to nominate the Governors-General of Australia, a precedent lawful and constitutional has been created for the permitting of the Church of England to have a similar voice in the election of its chief officers.

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Sundays of Man's Life (S.P.C.K. 6s.) is the title of an anthology of English poetry selected on the basis of the Calendar in the Prayer Book of 1928. In its 320 pages are collected most of the treasures of our country's religious poetry; and the result is a book which will make a delightful present in family or parish. Some of the best things of Traherne, Crashaw, and Vaughan represent the seventeenth century; Browning is frequently, and very rightly, drawn upon; and it was a most happy thought which led to the choice of four stanzas from Burns' *The Cottar's Saturday Night* for the second Sunday in Advent, and of part of Wordsworth's *The Happy Warrior* for St. George's Day. We foresee a great demand for this book.

A correspondent writes from Wellington, New Zealand:

"Anyone who is conscious of being in touch with the divine cannot help knowing that this means contact with ultimate beauty, but this commonplace of Christian experience is so seldom dwelt on that Miss Bullock's article, 'In Praise of Beauty,' in the May number of THEOLOGY, comes as a real refreshment. May I describe at least one church where 'worshippers' are allowed to see out of doors? In the heart of the New Zealand forest, on a site of which only just enough trees have been cleared to build the Church of St. James, Waiho, this little sanctuary stands with its chancel facing towards the lovely Franz Josef Glacier, which at this point descends to only a few hundred feet above sea level and is itself surrounded by the same primeval forest. All around are high snow peaks, and this 'loveliness of the world outside' is what frames the altar and gives light to the worshippers. For the designers of the perfect little apse have inserted clear glass panels for the windows, so that there can be no doubt in the minds of the worshippers or of the handful of children from the neighbourhood, whom the priest instructs in the Church whenever possible, that 'out of Sion, the perfection of beauty, God hath shined forth.' The same thing, I believe, has been tried at Mürren or some other Swiss resorts, but what is true of mountains is true also of less stupendous revelations of beauty, and above all of the sky, which even above grimy housetops still proclaims the glory of God."

NOTE

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT

THERE is one difficulty connected with this subject which orthodox writers on theology seem never to face. The very conception of eternity is an awful idea, even the thought of an eternity of bliss is not free from awe; but the realization of what is involved in an eternity of misery is simply unbearable, and the contemplation of it might seem likely to cause loss of sanity. How is it to be reconciled with the sense of justice, which the Creator has implanted in His creatures, that a finite fault should have an infinite punishment, and that, too, in respect of creatures who

come into existence through no choice of their own? Does anyone *really* believe that the lost will exist in misery for ever who makes any real effort to imagine what is actually implied in these beliefs?

It is perfectly possible to speak or write of this subject in a cold-blooded, detached, intellectual manner without any attempt to consider its full meaning, and even unconsciously to assume that it concerns other people only, and not oneself.

Those who accept this doctrine, with whatever degree of conscious apprehension, feel that they are compelled to do so by their interpretation of Scripture. The relevant texts may roughly be divided into two classes: (1) Those the literal meaning of which seems to imply that the lost will exist for ever, and (2) those which literally speak of or imply the death or destruction of the lost. Orthodox writers, as a rule, assume that group (1) is to be interpreted literally, and group (2) metaphorically. But why should not the converse rather be true?

The following texts, if taken literally, seem to imply the unending existence of the lost: (1) St. Matt. xviii. 8, xxv. 41, 46; St. Mark ix. 43, 47, 48; St. Jude 7; Rev. xiv. 11, xx. 10. The following speak of the death or destruction of the lost: (2*a*) St. Matt. x. 28; 2 Thess. i. 9; Phil. iii. 19. The following speak of eternal life as the portion of the saved, and death or destruction of the lost: (2*b*) St. Matt. vii. 13; St. John iii. 16, x. 28; Rom. vi. 21, 22, 23. Is it a more unnatural construction of language to interpret eternal punishment as referring to the endlessness of the condition rather than of the process, and eternal fire, the fire that is not quenched, the worm that dies not, as meaning that the punishment is inevitable and unintermittent rather than interminable, than to interpret death and destruction as meaning an unending existence of misery?

Moreover, the use of "fire" itself supports this interpretation, for the most obvious characteristic of fire is that it destroys life, certainly not that it preserves life. The use of "worm" points the same way. Further, the metaphors of the destruction of chaff, of trees, of tares, and of a withered branch by fire, certainly suggest the thoroughness of the process, rather than its continued operation.

There remain the passages about "the lake of fire" in the Apocalypse. There seems to be no general agreement as to how far the teaching of this book is to be taken literally, judging from the commentators. Is the lake of fire and brimstone itself to be taken literally? It is related that "death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire": this, of course, cannot be taken literally. It is said that the worshippers of the beast "shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb"; are we expected to believe that this will go on all through eternity?

The following texts speak of eternal life as being the reward of the saved: (2*c*) St. Matt. xix. 16, 17, 29, xxv. 46; St. Mark x. 17, 30; St. Luke xviii. 30; St. John iii. 15, iv. 14, v. 24, 39, vi. 40, 47, 51, 54, xii. 25, 50; Acts xiii. 46, 48; Rom. ii. 6, 7, v. 21; Gal. vi. 8; 1 Tim. i. 16, vi. 12; Titus i. 2, iii. 7; 1 St. John ii. 25, iii. 15, v. 11-20; St. Jude 21. The logical opposite of eternal life is eternal death, not a different kind of eternal life.

Whatever view is held on this subject, there are great difficulties involved; but none can compare with that overwhelming difficulty which I set forth at the beginning.

To prevent any possible misunderstanding, I will add that I am not arguing in favour of "universalism"; I am not throwing doubt on the

reality of the punishment of sin after death, only on its endlessness; and I am not endeavouring to minimize the heinousness of sin, our redemption from which had to be purchased at so great a price.

E. G. P. WYATT.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xxi., No. 4.

Dr. Joshua Finkel gives the text and translation of a Judæo-Persian tale from a MS. in the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Professor R. J H. Gottheil furnishes us with the text and translation of part of a treatise on medicine from the Genizah Fragments. Dr. Julius Greenstone reviews the two volumes issued to commemorate the Diamond Jubilee of Breslau Seminary. Amongst other items of interest in these two volumes there is an important study by Dr. Isaak Heinemann on the work of Philo and his place in the development of Judaism.

Professor Solomon Zeitlin gives a convincing and moderate reply to the attacks of Dr. Robert Eisler in his *The Messiah Jesus and John the Baptist*, the sensational press notices of which received undue attention in certain quarters, and in his article in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, xxi., Nos. 1 to 2. Zeitlin examines Eisler's discussions of the Slavonic Josephus, and still maintains that this work was translated from a Byzantine Greek version, which is a paraphrase of the "Wars of the Jews" written by Josephus; and, further, that the compiler of the Slavonic Josephus made free use of Hegesippus, Josippon, and the Church Fathers.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xxii., No. 1.

Dr. Cecil Roth contributes a valuable article, "The Religion of the Marranos," Jews who, though "converted" to Christianity in the days of the Inquisition, yet maintained, as far as knowledge and opportunity would allow, Jewish practice and belief. Children were taught the faith of their Fathers by their parents in secret. The Fasts were carefully kept, generally beginning a day or two late so as to avoid suspicion. Many will be astonished to read that a not inconsiderable number, while secretly practising Judaism, went so far in their endeavour to conceal the fact as to take Holy Orders. A remnant of this interesting community has been discovered in Portugal of recent years, still clinging eagerly to its old faith, and anxious to regain touch with the main body, from which it was severed over four hundred years ago.

There are several reviews. Dr. Julius Greenstone, commenting on a quantity of recent literature on Judaism, finds high praise for *The Legacy of Israel*, "an unbiassed, scientific, and accurate summary of some of the most important achievements of the Jewish people in the domain of spiritual and moral enterprise."

Some comments on the Palestine Mandate are worth noting, especially one which calls attention to the opinions of a Dutch Consul in Jerusalem. He thinks the Arab national movement is not very deep-rooted, but that

it has been promoted by the land-owning class; also the theory that the Arabs had been driven out by Jews is refuted by the fact that the Arabs in Palestine are more numerous now than before the Jewish settlement.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

British Museum Quarterly. Vol. v., Nos. 3 and 4; vol. vi., No. 1.

Amongst many other items of interest, the British Museum has recently acquired an early Christian gold finger-ring, probably from Syria or Egypt; some fine Babylonian cylinder seals; a notable collection of German woodcuts from the Abbey of St. Gallen, the finest of which, the Man of Sorrows, is in perfect condition; a sandstone relief of the Eighteenth Dynasty, probably from the doorway of a tomb or private shrine; all these are illustrated and described in the quarterly numbers now reviewed.

The Department of Manuscripts has acquired a long strip of vellum containing a series of miniatures of the life of St. John the Baptist, which seems to be part of the *Hortus Deliciarum* of Herrad of Landsperg, Abbess of Hohenburg in Alsace, 1167-95, the bulk of which was destroyed by fire in the siege of Strasburg, 1870. Hence the Museum almost certainly now possesses what is probably the only surviving fragment of one of the most famous of medieval illuminated manuscripts.

Excellent illustrations are given of the fine chalice and paten taken in 1890 from the tomb of Archbishop Hubert Walter (1193-1205), which have formed the subject of an interesting investigation recently in the Museum Laboratory.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique.

In the July number Father Cerfaux elaborately discusses 1 Cor. i. 18 to iii. 24. Incidentally he throws out speculations. Did not some of the Apostle's rabbinical masters put him on his guard against Greek science? Father F. Cabrol writes at length on Bossuet's relationship with England. In it there is much on the problem of reunion, and the author concludes: "Bossuet est mort, hélas! sans avoir vu se réaliser ses espérances d'un rapprochement avec les anglicans. On sait que ces tentatives ont été reprises de nos jours sans plus de succès. Nous croyons que l'étude des œuvres de Bossuet ne pourrait qu'aider dans l'avenir nos frères séparés à mieux comprendre et à mieux goûter la doctrine de l'Église catholique et par suite à les rapprocher de nous." Father Constant studies the origins of the "schisme anglican." Father Antheunis deals with a Roman Catholic refugee in the Low Countries, Sir Roger Ashton, who died in 1592. Father Maere studies the progress of Christian archæology in Belgium from 1830-1930.

R. H. MURRAY.

REVIEWS

THE REALITY OF GOD; AND RELIGION AND AGNOSTICISM. Being the Literary Remains of Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Edited by Edmund G. Gardner, F.B.A. J. M. Dent and Sons. 15s.

These are fragments of two books, both left unfinished, though for different reasons, by the Baron at the time of his death, and separated as to date of composition by an interval of some eight years. The second one, *Religion and Agnosticism*, is the earlier. It consists of an examination of the religious views of the author's friend, Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall, the author of *Asiatic Studies*. From what lies before us it is impossible to discover why it was not completed. As it stands it deals with Sir Alfred's agnosticism and his application of the ancient and now largely discredited theory of Euhemerism to the origin of Indian religion and tentatively to the origin of religion as such.

But the author clearly intimates that there was a deep and genuine current of faith under all this, which, on rare occasions, came to the surface. Unfortunately this is what presumably would have been dealt with in the part of the essay which we have not got. In what we have there are two sections of great merit and interest, which make us grateful for this publication. There is the careful and painstaking account of Euhemerism in Part II., in itself a tightly compact little book of reference on this not very well known subject; and, exceeding this in value as in length, the extraordinarily competent and comprehensive treatment of agnosticism as a philosophical, not a religious, theory in Part I. It is indeed good that this should have been rescued from oblivion.

The main interest of the volume before us lies, of course, in "The Reality of God," which occupies 151 out of 256 pages. This is a fragment of what would have been a truly great work, von Hügel's Gifford Lectures for 1924-26. He was appointed lecturer in 1922, but in November of that year he was obliged, on account of failing health, to withdraw his acceptance. He continued, however, to work at his chosen subject for the last two years of his life, and here we have some portion of the result. For, the editor tells us, a great deal was hardly more than raw material, or masses of quotations, or else had undergone no revision. Underneath this bit of dry detail lies a story of real heroism, as we see this great teacher in spite of increasing physical weakness and mental weariness forcing himself to the task of composition. Thus a great and doubtless keenly felt burden has lain upon the editor. He has accomplished his task

with great skill. Some few of the chapters are practically the Gifford Lectures as they would have been given. Others are fragments only, consisting of a few pages. Hence occasionally a reference to what has gone before is rather puzzling, and here and there the contents of a chapter do not appear entirely to correspond to the title.

Von Hügel's Gifford Lectures upon the Reality of God were planned on a noble scale. They were divided into three great sections: epistemological, ethical, and a third dealing with the need for an institutional religion. But, as we have said, we have only fragments of this nobly planned work. But for these we are grateful.

The chief feature of value, and I think of permanent value, is the insistence upon the reality of the thing known, whether it be a geological stratum (the Baron was a student of geology from early days) or a flower or an insect or God. Throughout the human mind is in direct contact with that which is real. This note is struck at the beginning and continues to sound throughout. Thus the knowledge of God through the physical world is in a sense nearer to what religion craves than that knowledge of Him which we gain through conscience. For religion is essentially the sense of a Presence (*cf.* p. 71).

There is, still in accordance with this central conception, a fine section (chapter v.) upon our deliverance through the concept of evolution from the mechanistic idea of the natural world.

The thought of joy as inseparable from religion, whether in Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, or the great Christian writers, whereby religion is distinguished from moralism, is beautifully worked out in Chapter I.

The passage on liberty in God and man (pp. 119 sqq.) is thoroughly sound, but the position taken does not appear to be very different from that of the Archbishop of York, which is here criticized. Formal freedom or power of choice is not true freedom, but only, for human beings, the necessary foundation for such true freedom as they may attain. True freedom, the power at each instant to realize one's true self (negatively, *non posse peccare*), belongs to God alone.

Perhaps it is too trifling a criticism to remark that our eyes are quite certainly incapable of perceiving the stimulation of the optic nerves (p. 134). It is a graver matter that the impossibility of a purely spiritual experience of God in this life is denied in too absolute a manner (pp. 139, 140).

The work concludes with a passage on the true nature of Catholicism (p. 151), which exhibits a noble breadth of view combined with glowing enthusiasm. Here, indeed, we have Baron von Hügel at his very best.

J. H. Beibitz.

THE VISION OF GOD. By Kenneth E. Kirk, D.D. (The Bampton Lectures for 1928.) Longmans. Price 25s.

It is doubtful whether any English reviewer of this book can tell the truth about it without confessing his own debt. To one, at all events, the debt is not to be measured only by the vast amount of new knowledge made accessible, or by the store of references to further sources of valuable information and criticism; for it extends into the sphere of new and deeper appreciation of some fundamentals of Christian life. Illumined by less insight, how much might equal learning have missed! Among the many volumes of Bampton Lectures there are some more brilliant in style, for Dr. Kirk does not write as the careful composer of prose, but as one who sets down his multitudinous facts and leisurely records the impressions they have made together with his thoughts and inferences; others are more remarkable either for their condensation of a vast subject so as clearly to draw its essential outlines, or for their defence of some Christian doctrine; but even as judged by the high standard of excellence set by his recent predecessors in this Lectureship, it can be safely said that no more worthy or learned book than Dr. Kirk's adorns the series. Some may feel that it lacks unity; having read it three times, I think the explanation is that its compass seems to obscure the unity which exists. Then it is to be remembered that the author's purpose is not to give a *complete* history of Christian thought about the true end, the *summum bonum*, of man, but also to set forth its *doctrine*. What this has been is to be seen in the attempts to exhibit Christian morality in codes of moral precepts, in the exercise of corporate discipline, and in the organization of asceticism in monasticism. The relevant material is thus no less than the whole corporate life of Christianity, and Dr. Kirk has inevitably chosen certain "moments" (to use the word by which Canon Lilley describes his own similar procedure) in the history of Christian life to illustrate the excellences, the pedestrian levels, and the perversions of his theme. Much excellent material, such as that already dealt with in the Bampton Lectures on *Christian Mysticism*, he has deliberately omitted.

Dr. Kirk begins by showing that the sixth of the Matthean Beatitudes was early recognized to express the final blessedness of Christian life. Its pursuit quickly issued in very varied lines of conduct, in which were at once involved the questions of authority and discipline. In their turn these were, as always, influenced by the Church's environment. In a predominantly pagan world the Church tends, when she is loyal to her ideal, to display the rigorist temper: in her task of directing the needs of a nominally Christian society she tends to formalism. Conduct,

creed and experience are not really separate because they are separable for thought. We are then shown anticipations of the Christian doctrine of the vision of God in Judaism, where they were not absent even in Rabbinic theology; in Plato and other philosophers, in the Mysteries, in Philo and in the Hermetic books. Christianity thus "came into a world tantalized with the belief that some men at least had seen God, and had found in the vision the sum of human happiness."

The lecture which expounds the thought of the vision of God in the New Testament is one of the best things in this excellent book. Here are stated principles without which the teaching of our Lord and of his early great followers cannot be appreciated. It is argued that the ancestry of the ascetic element in Christianity is not to be found in the pagan dualism of the surrounding world. In our Lord's outlook there is an "amazing conjunction of the two ideals of rigorism and humanism . . . neither can be eliminated, yet no clue to their reconciliation is expressed." Hence the *tension* which dominates the gospel—the negative movement thus planted right within even the purest attachment to the best of things, on which von Hügel used to insist. It is only accentuated by the fact that, as Dr. Kirk shows, the theological basis of Jesus' asceticism is not supplied by the eschatology; indeed, Dr. Kirk might have further emphasized the paradox that the world-renouncing teaching does not occur in eschatological contexts; nowhere is the eschatology appealed to as the motive of world-renunciation. Dr. Kirk accepts the general view that St. Luke has introduced ascetic emphasis and additions: the 'Ebionism' of the third gospel has a real basis in fact. The central position and significance, in the earliest gospel, of the dual incident of St. Peter's confession and the Transfiguration, are well brought out—it is "a vision of the divinity breaking through the humanity of Jesus." The same theme is shown to be central in St. Paul, while the fourth gospel, as Loisy said, is a perpetual theophany. The vision is possible here and now; it is revealed "in the face of Jesus Christ"—the historic Christ, and it is corporate. In his teaching, Jesus did not insist on the necessity of the vision of God, but—

> "he brought God more vividly before the spiritual eyes of his contemporaries than any other has ever done. He *gave* a vision of God where others could only *speak* of it."

Here is revealed the profound truth which Dr. Kirk emphasizes over and over again as being the excellence of the Christian doctrine of the highest good, namely, that when any thought whatsoever of man takes the primary place instead of the thought of God, "the whole purpose of a gospel is undone." "The path

of purity, humility, and self-sacrifice is only possible to the man who can *forget* himself," who can, in H. Bremond's telling phrase, "disinfect himself from egoism." We can never "by thinking about *ourselves* and our conduct achieve that self-forgetfulness or self-sacrifice which is the hall-mark of the saints." Even—

> "self-examination and self-criticism are dangerous in the highest degree unless the soul is already reaching out in self-forgetfulness to something higher and better than itself. Self-centredness, even in the morally earnest, is the greatest snare in life: 'God-centredness' the only true salvation."

This explains Jesus' teaching about reward, which can neither be eliminated nor minimized. Dr. Kirk shows its uniqueness. There would be no reward except to those who would follow from another motive, but to them the thought of reward was not to be a moral offence. Jesus forbids alike the pursuit of reward and the conscious pursuit of disinterestedness, and thus avoids the unethical consequences of the complacent contemplation of self as indifferent to all thought of reward. The only reward of the supreme good is its actuality and permanence. Dr. Kirk next traces the beginnings of formalism in the New Testament and in sub-apostolic times. Implemented by discipline, the result was at first a rise in the moral standard. Discipline—it is another of Dr. Kirk's emphasized points—tends to good only if used *pastorally* and not *penally*. But, having realized that "asceticism was at most only one of the tendencies in the teaching of Jesus," we pass to the marvel that the Church "so soon removed from Him that called you into the grace of Christ unto another gospel." The imposition of obligatory severe asceticism on the whole Christian community was "wholly at issue with the Christian doctrine of the vision of God as we have just seen it taking shape," and uncompromising asceticism could only make headway when "the first balanced rapture of the new religion lost its grip upon the Church." This leads to a fascinating picture of the rise of monasticism and its connection with the pursuit of the vision of God, and we are shown how, by ignoring fundamental principles, it was often perverted into a quest for visions and ecstasy, which reproduces the error of looking at oneself and not at God. The true human activity in worship, culminating in self-forgetfulness, is rather looking *towards* God than looking *at* Him. An illuminating discussion of the complicated question of Gnosticism prefaces consideration of the extremes of rigorist discipline, and there is more than an ethical connection between the two:

> "The doctrine of the 'unnatural' God—the God whose presence and operation is to be discerned only in the miraculous, the abnormal,

> the unheard-of—dominates them both . . . the rigorist in discipline showed himself of the same school of thought when he insisted, in effect, that only those could be called Christians upon whom God had miraculously conferred the grace of perfect sinlessness."

Dr. Kirk, however, does not think the Christian perversion was due to borrowing from Gnosticism, and finds a sufficient empirical origin for it in the experience and results of sudden conversion.

Two lectures are devoted to the story of the long and difficult escape from excessive rigorism of doctrine and discipline. There is a penetrating exposition and severe criticism of the "two lives" and "double-standard" theories in all their forms, including the modern; and an historically critical account of the reform of monasticism and penance, without which "the Church would have dwindled to a tiny sect of anti-social hermits." But if the doctrine of the 'unnatural God' was rejected, pure and undisguised Naturalism has never found a place in Christianity. Dr. Kirk's charming studies of Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and particularly of St. Augustine and of St. Bernard, and his story of the gradual reduction of chaos to order in the work of the Victorines, St. Thomas, St. Ignatius of Loyola and St. Francis de Sales, is really the story of the attempt to bring into harmony the essential truths inherent in the doctrine of the 'unnatural God' and its consequences, and in that of Naturalism and its consequences. The careful study of what is here told of that magnificent attempt ought to give pause to some of our emotional reformers who talk as though the one thing now needful is to sweep it all away—an attitude the more remarkable since, if there was ever any doubt that St. Augustine (in spite of his excesses) and St. Thomas saw infinitely deeper than Pelagian naturalism, modern psychology has removed it.

Dr. Kirk's final chapter, "Law and Promise," gathers up and integrates the principles which emerge from his long-range study. First, these principles are once again shown in conflict in early Protestantism and in its contemporary Catholicism, and later in the "Pure Love" controversy between Bossuet and Fénelon. Finally, the modern objections brought against the ideal of 'the vision of God' are, in my judgment, unanswerably met, and the refutation carries the greater weight because of the frank admission of its dangers and the criticism of the errors to which it is liable.

> "To look towards God, and from that 'look' to acquire insight both into the follies of one's own heart and the needs of one's neighbours, with the power to correct the one no less than to serve the other—this is something very remote from any quest for 'religious experience' for its own sake. Yet this, and nothing else, is what the

vision of God has meant in the fully-developed thought of historic Christianity."

The spirit of worship is the only way to unselfishness; it alone "guarantees to service that quality of humility without which it is no service at all," but only offensive patronage. Of course, there are those "who rise from their knees with a self-complacency rivalling the worst conceits of men of action." They are but beginners. Others serve their fellows "with a humility which puts the ordinary Christian to shame." Their attitude towards their ideal, whether consciously or not, is already one of worship. With these exceptions the principle stands that "Disinterested service is the only service that is serviceable, and disinterestedness comes by the life of worship alone." 'Salvation,' 'the Kingdom of God,' 'eternal life'—these phrases cannot be understood apart from the fact of Christ. But they do not carry the mind inevitably back to him. On the other hand, we cannot reflect on 'the vision of God' without remembering that "the Church has already seen God in the face of Jesus Christ." There is thus no question whether we are psychologically capable of seeing God: we have already seen Him. Nor is the spirit of worship only to be gained by struggle. It is the endowment of all and thrust upon us.

> "Wherever goodness has attracted the soul, it has evoked the spirit of worship; and it will continue to attract. We may resist, deny, or betray; we may welcome, co-operate, and adore; but we shall never be masters of the situation. Worship depends not upon our activities, but upon the activities which God brings to bear upon us; to them we are forced to react as worshippers."

The excellence of this book of 472 pages (with a further 79 pages of Additional Notes), which gives such value to its immense learning, is its combined impartiality with deep insight. Though the subject is beset with temptations to emotional rhetoric or vehement denunciation, no modern theological book I have read bespeaks more truly the attitude of pure science. It proclaims itself the work of a man with inside knowledge of what Christian life is, and at its best has tried to be, but there are few indications of the author's 'school of thought.' The devastating criticism of the alleged pagan origin of Christian monasticism stands with the repudiation of all suggestions that the monastic life is in itself higher than Christian life 'in the world,' and the frank recognition that the choice between the Religious life (in the familiar technical sense) and Christian life 'in the world,' belongs entirely to what Dr. Rashdall called the realm of "vocational morality," in which each man's duty is the absolute duty *for him*, and his supreme excellence. The consequences of rejecting this position are set forth without

compromise and, with the notes on "Public Penance in the first five centuries," and "The question of private absolution in the early Church," should correct some popular forms of teaching on these subjects. It is a truly great work and has secured to its author a prominent place in the front rank of theologians. He has things to say which our world needs to hear and heed. The price of his book is a necessary tragedy; but every clergyman should try to possess it, for from it is to be gained much more than from the purchase of several other books to double the cost. Its size and range may at first bewilder, but study of the full analyses and indices will soon surmount that difficulty. Meditation upon its contents will provide a vast source of material for wise pastoral teaching, for it conducts to the springs of life.

J. S. BEZZANT.

NOTICES

ON THE MINOR PROPHECIES OF WILLIAM BLAKE. By Emily S. Hamblen. With an Introduction by S. Foster Damon. Dent. 15s.

An addition to the many recent works on Blake shows the growing interest, rising sometimes to idolatry, which modern people are taking in the artist and the mystic. Miss Emily S. Hamblen, of New Jersey, has as equipment for her very detailed exposition of *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, *The Book of Urizen*, *Thel*, *Tiriel*, *The Book of Los*, and the other "minor prophecies," a most profound knowledge of the ancient schemes of symbolism, the use of which often makes Blake obscure. According to her they are a universal spiritual language, spoken by the wise men of old, which must be understood if we are to get beneath the surface of *The Book of the Dead*, the Hebrew Scriptures, the Chinese classics, and even the teaching of our Lord; behind it is the doctrine of "the Zodiacal man," and all the paraphernalia of the Kabbala. Whatever we think of this, some knowledge of it will help us to understand the magnificent poetry of Blake, and here Miss Hamblen is helpful.

She makes us realize his enigmatic figure, like a foundling in the arid desert of his own day, a rebel against the Deists, a rebel against Catholic and Protestant alike, a rebel against the rationalistic side of the Swedenborgian teaching in which he had been reared. Blake was indeed a thwarted genius within and without, and out of his own inner life of spiritual aspiration, clogged in its rise by the world and the body, he threw kindred interpretations of the universe and of the developing life of man in history on the dark screen of his prophecies. In his desire to rise, and that all should rise, to pure spiritual energy, he revolts against Morality and forestalls Nietzsche in his vision of a superman. In his sense of spiritual liberty he revolts against Rationalism, anticipates Bergson, and stigmatizes Plato as the origin of the corruption of thought and life. Independent, determined to unmask unreal conventions, and to speak the truth like the prophets of old, we go to him crying in

the wilderness, describing by word and symbol the divine urge in the spirit towards unity, and assuring us that all tends thither, and receive the best of tonics, a strengthened assurance of the supremacy of the spiritual forces in man and his world. But we need people like Miss Hamblen to let us into the secret of the language. W. J. FERRAR.

BEHAVIOURISM: A SYMPOSIUM. Edited by Wm. P. King. Pp. 160. S.C.M. 5s.

This volume is a symposium by leading American teachers of psychology. For many its value will consist in its competent criticism of a school of investigation which *in theorizing* has pushed beyond its mark. So long as Behaviourism works with those data and conclusions to which its laboratory methods are adapted, it may continue to extend our knowledge and to influence practice within the field of its operations. But when human nature itself is confined within the limits and restricted to the terms of the S.R. bond (stimulus response), it is well to remind Behaviourists that by all tests of adequacy they fall short of a full description.

There are some considerations towards which all these essays converge; and they all call Behaviourism in question in respect of *adequacy*. Professors William McDougall and R. L. Finney especially dwell upon the limitations of Behaviourism on account of its mechanical bias. Dr. W. E. Garrison (in ch. iii.) emphasizes the shortcomings of any theory which, neglecting valuation, must remain a mere technique of control. Causal explanations are meaningless except in the light of standards of value affording discrimination between truth and error.

Such limitations are the sources of positive errors; in description and above all in synthesis. Recognition of this prompts the rise in Germany at the present time of the *Gestalt* psychology of Köhler and Koffka, who attempt to correct these fictitious simplifications by description of the complete situations in which behaviour occurs.

But we do not suppose that the contributors to the volume merely wished to point out the almost manifest limitations of Behaviourism and the inadequacy of its view of the task of psychology. It is not so much with the fact of its claim to be an "ology" as with its actually being an "ism" that they are concerned. It is "cultish" and rides a hobby. And if the "psychology they teach in New York" is at all fairly described, it is at least every man's concern. But it requires more than a sense of humour to appreciate a situation when "in the metropolis of a nation which asserts its moral leadership of the world" a theory is dominant and extensively taught which is incompatible with any estimate of man as a responsible being, knowing good and evil.

F. W. BUTLER.

THE NEW DIVINE ORDER. By Karl Heim, D.Th. English translation by E. P. Dickie, with a Foreword by Professor H. R. Mackintosh, D.D. Pp. 124. S.C.M. Press. 4s. 6d. net.

The importance of this book is not to be estimated by its size. It is a significant example of the work in constructive Christian theology of the younger school of German theologians. Shaking off the yoke of Schleiermacher, it advances the distinctively Christian conception of the relations of Time and Eternity: a step forward in their interpretation

in present-day light. It is motived by the question, What must we say about these relations "if God has become a reality for us"?

The views on this question of Barth, Otto, Bultmann, Althaus, Dibelius, Tillich, Titius, and others are considered, and, on the whole, either corrected or supplemented by the estimate of the time-form and its present eternal content involved in a Christian view of the relation between spirit and nature.

The *telos* must be both annulment and *ἀποκάλυψις*. The veil of the time-form must fall. "The *σχῆμα* of this world passes away." The annulment of the time-form is not annihilation thereof, but *disclosure*—disclosure of the eternal content already latent therein—otherwise the victory of God throughout all ranges of existence is not manifested. The conception is in radical opposition to both Kantian and Neo-Platonic ideas in respect of their practical isolation of the non-objectifiable ego from the actual world of experience; on the same account there is some difference from Troeltsch and Otto, and even from Barth. Bergson's view of real time and modern dynamic conceptions in physics are found to afford means of exposition of Heim's conceptions.

The book is another indication of the value of contemporary concepts in science and in metaphysics as vindicating, and affording media for re-expression of, Christian ideas. It should secure the attention of all interested in philosophical theology, while at the same time it has a distinct bearing upon Christian ethics and practical activities.

F. W. Butler.

V. S. S. Coles. Edited by the Rev. J. F. Briscoe. Mowbrays. 7s. 6d.

Of Canon Coles, after his death, Bishop Gore wrote: "I wonder if there was any one of his contemporaries who knew so many people, as one may say, within and without and remembered all about them." Those who knew him will be grateful to the writers for this book. And those who did not know him but are interested in the Catholic Revival will be glad to read about the great priest who did so much for the cause. As first librarian and then Principal of Pusey House, Oxford, the friend of generations of undergraduates, as preacher in all parts of England, as confessor and spiritual guide, he touched and influenced very many lives. And he did not pass on and forget them. When towards the end of Canon Coles' life the writer of this review was staying at Shepton Beauchamp, the Canon sent for him. He wished to question him about something he had said when he was an undergraduate at Oxford forty years before.

But before he went to Pusey House he was Rector of a country village in Somerset. And to the end, as Mr. Briscoe says, "always in Shepton was his heart. Everyone, everything there he loved with a passionate devotion: nothing he found at Oxford, or Mirfield, or Truro, or London interested him nearly so much as the spiritual welfare of its people."

The book contains not only a sketch of Canon Coles' life, but also papers on the Catholic Revival, some of his instructions and addresses, and hymns and verses composed by him. And its illustrations, especially the frontispiece, a photograph taken at Truro in 1917, will be a joy to those who knew him and loved him at Oxford and Shepton Beauchamp.

M. Paterson.

THE LAYFOLK'S HISTORY OF THE LITURGY. E. Crewdson Thomas, LL.B. Rivingtons. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Thomas's purpose is excellent. He sets out to supply the ordinary educated person with such information about the history of liturgy and of the English rite as will enable him to judge intelligently of the aftermath of the Prayer Book controversy. He seems to have read widely, and the bibliography is the best thing in the book. There is an elaborate apparatus of tables and appendices, and a copious index. Unfortunately the author's own work is marred by a curious inaccuracy and a terribly slipshod style. He confuses the First Council of the Lateran with the Fourth, the *traditio symboli* with the *traditio instrumentorum*, the anamnesis with the words of institution. He states that "the use of bells, colours, vestments, and bowing to the altar were no doubt taken from the Temple worship"; that "the Gallic Church had the same use of special consecration of bread and wine in the vestry which obtained in the Greek Church." The Epiklesis in the 1927-8 book is said to be taken from the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom, while the book of 1662 "is for the most part taken direct from the Sarum Use." The Greek Church, he tells us, denies the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, and therefore omits *Filioque* from the Creed. This certainly seems a perverse manner of stating the facts of the case.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS. By G. P. H. Pawson. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d. net.

Mr. Pawson has written a very useful monograph on the Cambridge Platonists and their place in religious thought. He is concerned in successive chapters to introduce Whichcote, John Smith, Henry More, Cudworth, Culverwel, and the minor members of the school in the setting of their own times, and in a final chapter he indicates the place which is theirs in a larger picture. The book constitutes the substance of the author's Hulsean Prize Essay, with an appreciative Foreword by Dr. Alexander Nairne. If the essence of the message of the Cambridge Platonists is, in Whichcote's words, "a good mind and a good life," it is clear that a study of it and the capture afresh of the spirit of Christian Platonism are needed in every generation, and not least in our own. Mr. Pawson's Essay may entice readers to study the writings of the Cambridge Platonists at first hand, and thus enter into a rare and refreshing atmosphere. We agree with Dr. Nairne that Mr. Pawson's little volume is "a companion for fellow-disciples in the school of Whichcote and Worthington, not didactic, not compendious, but of good conversation."

H. MAURICE RELTON.

THE SECRET WAY OF THE ENCLOSED GARDEN, AFTER THE BLESSED LOUIS-MARIE GRIGNON DE MONTFORT. By François Pilet, S.M.M. Translated by C. M. D. B. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 5s.

A translation of *Le Secret Marial de la Sainteté*, which is an amplification and warm recommendation of de Montfort's teaching, the true devotion to our Lady. To call it unscriptural is an understatement; it renders the New Testament meaningless. "Mary alone is the Treasurer and Dispenser of all graces." "We must never go to our Lord except through Mary." "Jesus died for the glory of God and of Mary." "We

must do all things in Mary." "Mary must dwell in the predestinate." There is no rational argument anywhere in the book, but only dogmatic assertions of the wildest kind. Emphatically a work for the unintelligent. It seems inspired by the idea that the only alternative to Illuminism is to ignore the Holy Spirit completely. The Secret of Mary is a privilege of Chosen Souls. One hopes they are few, but there is an Archconfraternity to spread the devotion. The translation is no better than the subject-matter.

V. I. RUFFER.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. By J. K. Mozley, D.D. Cambridge University Press. 5s.

Canon J. K. Mozley's B.B.C. lectures of July and August, 1930, are a marvel of compression. They follow the development of Christian Theology from the New Testament to the Council of Nicæa; there have been many such attempts, which have only invited the unwary into a thorny forest of disconnected names and dates; Canon Mozley never allows himself to drop the clue which guides him through the maze as he passes from century to century, rejecting all side-issues, showing how progressive movement lived in great personalities, and was at the same time evident in the worship and sentiment of the corporate body. The clue of course is the tension between the New Testament conceptions of the Unity of God and the Divinity of the perfect Manhood of Christ. It is possible for any person of ordinary education to get a correct picture of the progressive movement in the Apostolic Fathers, the Apologists, Tertullian and Irenæus, as they fought the Gnostics, and above all in Origen and Athanasius, the former "one of the most extraordinary men in the history of the Christian Church . . . his place is among the select few of the first class." So skilful is this presentment that the conclusions of Nicæa, when they come, all seem to be inevitable.

Perhaps the lectures might have rubbed in more pungently the analogies between various forms of Gnosticism and some movements of today; indeed, greater liveliness would have been attained if ancient and modern outlooks had been compared more often. I think there are only two such comparisons, that of the Alexandrians to the Cambridge Platonists, and of Athanasius to Karl Barth. But where the writer has reached what is evidently his chosen goal, a clear presentment of all the *necessary* facts and progressive ideas that reach their climax at Nicæa, the critic must be silent.

I wonder if this small volume is a sign of the times; will people some day be talking of "the B.B.C. Lectures on Theology" as we talk now of the Bamptons, and statues be erected of Mozley as the man who brought Theology from the University to the market-place?

W. J. FERRAR.

THE RELIGION OF MAN. By Rabindranath Tagore. The Hibbert Lectures for 1930. Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

In reading this book it will be well to submit to the charm and distinction of expression which characterizes this as all the writings of this distinguished author. Though we shall not find here those precise

definitions and correlations of the manifold phases and features of Indian religious philosophy given to us by Professors Das Gupta and S. Radhakrishnan, we shall find an original and persuasive presentation of some spiritual intuitions. It is, as it claims to be, the religious philosophy of a poet, and it includes the record of a spiritual pilgrimage. Its Western affinities are with the followers of the "inner light." The thought and interest of the book range over a wide field, and at many points it yields more to the creative imagination than it does to analysis and synthesis of concepts.

We are left with an enhanced sense of the universality of philosophy's task and how the ultimate problems of thought are identical in every age and for every race. The relation of "the religion of man" to the God thereby implied, the relation of Being to Becoming, of Reality to Appearance—all these ultimate issues (really one issue) are presented in different idiom but with identical content in India as in Western Europe. The distinguished author rather leaves in juxtaposition Brahman, the absolute Truth, and "that which appears to be true to the human mind." But in the rich system of Vedanta there are elements which allow that the time-process may be interpreted as a real manifestation, and even aspect, of the life of Brahman. It is, however, more than possible that some elements in that Western thought which Tagore so generously appreciates may contribute towards a solution of a problem which is identical East and West. For such a unification and synthesis the profound human truths set forth in this book must contribute their meaning; and the characteristics of a "religion of man," solidarity, love, self-realization through self-dedication, may well be the key not only to human values and destiny, but also to the nature of the one "in whom we live and move."

F. W. Butler.

The Head of the Corner. By L. M. Sweet. Scribners. 7s. 6d.

This is a study of the way in which, while the substance of other religions is the teaching of their founders, in Christianity it came to be the Founder Himself. He is the *fact* from which all is derived, and criticism has only strengthened the view that the interpretation of the fact was based on first-hand evidence. In the early Church Gospels and Epistles were valued as the work of Apostles or friends of Apostles. They show the disciples' confusion of mind about Christ which was still unresolved at the time of His death, yet "the same men who knew Jesus when he lived among them, and saw him die, preached him as alive after his death," and not only alive, but Son of God. What was the ground of this interpretation? It was the tremendous impression made by His personality. His object in choosing the Apostles was that "they should be with him," and by seeing Him at work in all possible circumstances receive the indelible impression of His mind and His person. That impression was such that not only were the historic ideas of Messiah and Servant reinterpreted in terms of Him, but the very idea of the Father Himself as revealed by the Son. It may be true that He never claimed in so many words to be Son of God. What He was in Himself claimed it for Him.

M. D. R. Willink.

THE SECULAR PRIESTHOOD. By E. J. Mahoney, D.D. With a Preface by Cardinal Bourne. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 1930. 6s.

This book is not a handbook of the priestly life for the clergy, but a treatise on the priesthood addressed chiefly to the laity and to candidates for ordination. It aims at vindicating the dignity of the priesthood in itself, as the public office of the Church; the secular priesthood is therefore not in any sense a lower way than the Religious Life. There is much in this book that Anglicans would wish to see expressed otherwise; nevertheless, it is full of sound sense. Perhaps the best part of the book is the treatment of vocation. Vocation to the priesthood does not consist only or chiefly in a personal call; no individual has a claim to be ordained, for it rests with the Church to take only so many as she needs. The call of God is in any case tested by the Church through her responsible authorities, and is consummated in the act of ordination.

A. G. HEBERT.

A SPIRITUAL PILGRIMAGE TOWARDS THE THRESHOLD OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: BEING EXTRACTS FROM AN UNFINISHED DIARY. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

There is something pathetic about this book. The author, whose anonymity is elaborately preserved, seems to have spent a lifetime in worrying about the true Church, but now that his intellectual perplexities are almost solved finds, or thinks he finds, that the way of approach is spiritual and not intellectual. Thus on the one hand he wonders if all this worry may not have been sheer waste of energy, but on the other he cannot even now make up his mind to the decisive step; he feels he must wait for Divine leading. Yet even if the call does come now, it seems to him that he is tragically too late. "That is the bitter drop in my cup. If I go in I shall be worn out and useless. Yesterday I felt that the end was coming to my search, that one foot was over the threshold. And then the thought that I had but the remnant of my days left, and the final end and welcome death will soon, too soon, alas! appear, held me back. God knows I have done my best, with such means as I have, to reach the Fold from which my forefathers were driven, but if it is not to be I must bite my lips and remain in exile. I cannot go in until God leads me. I stand at the door and knock and *wait*."

It is the pathos of this position which is really distinctive in the book. Apart from that it is little more than the articulation of the attractiveness of Roman Catholicism for so many modern religious minds. The author sets down at length the story of his original attraction by the Catholic atmosphere. The one question which he does not consider at all is the extent to which that is really dependent on the Papacy. It is taken for granted that Catholicism must mean Roman Catholicism, and this in spite of the fact that he is familiar with the works of Dr. Gore and the late Prof. Turner.

The vital question then is, "Can I accept the Papacy?" Round this question the author circles again and again, ever apparently on the point of saying "Yes," until at last he seems to swerve and alight on the insecure and swaying perch of his ultimate, or surely only penultimate, position. He is certainly justified in claiming to have done his best to solve his problem on the intellectual side. He seems to have read and pondered everything that has been written. Naturally he finds that there is much

more to be said for the Papacy than his early training would have led him to suppose. There is, indeed, little difficulty in proving that St. Peter had a real primacy in the Apostolic Church, and that Rome had a real primacy in the primitive Church. The difficulties begin to arise when it is thought necessary to prove that the latter is so clearly the continuation of the former as to necessitate the conclusion that Papal autocracy and infallibility are part of the Divine constitution of the Church. This is where the strain seems too great to be borne. Possibilities become probabilities, and probabilities are exalted into necessary truths. "Does not the right to be appealed to imply that Rome was the supreme court which could not decide erroneously?" That is a characteristic sentence of Papalist apologetic. Of course, it implies nothing of the kind. The formulations of Catholic theology do indeed seem to be necessary to clarify and defend the orginal revelation, but such a claim cannot be urged for the position at present claimed for the Pope. During the famous Malines "Conversations" Mgr. Van Roey, now Cardinal Mercier's successor, said that the decision of the Pope on a doctrinal point may contradict the opinion of the majority of the very Council summoned to discuss the point, and that the Papal definition will still be infallible if the Pope means it to be so; and that this view of infallibility is certain, the only doubtful point being whether the infallibility of the decision is Papal or Conciliar. But is there any smallest germ in primitive history which could rightly grow into so monstrous an assertion? Here is a personal infallibility in the Pope separate from that of the Church. Of course, there is another possible interpretation of the Vatican decree on the subject—namely, that when the Pope has ratified a decision of the Council no *subsequent* "consent of the Church" need be demanded. The decision of a true Œcumenical Council, accepted and ratified by the Pope as Primate of the Church, is sufficient ground for believing that we have the mind of the Spirit. The text of the Vatican decree seems capable of bearing this interpretation, and it is perhaps probable that it is so interpreted by individual theologians. That is the only reason why it is worth while to keep open the possibility of the whole Church accepting the Vatican decrees at some future date with a "minimizing" interpretation. But our anonymous author, while fully conscious of the difficulty of believing that the Pope can at any moment "bind the Church to any doctrinal formulation that he chooses," avoids it by asserting that he is supernaturally protected from binding an erroneous definition on the Church. But where is evidence of this so strong that it should be represented as an essential part of the Christian faith? It is surely impossible to show that this was implicit in the early acknowledgment of Petrine and of Roman primacy.

There is much in the book which is an echo of thoughts which must often pass through the minds of those who love the Church and revere her Chief Bishop; and it is impossible not to feel deep sympathy with the perplexities which have deprived the life of our diarist of joy and peace in believing: but is it not a duty to make up our minds on these questions to the best of our ability and then act on our decisions? Surely we may have confidence that God will never withhold from us such light as is needful to show us the way to heaven.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER. By Rudolf Allers, M.D. Translated with an introduction by E. B. Shane, M.A., M.D., M.R.C.P. Sheed and Ward. 16s.

We are so much accustomed to be told that men of science, including psychologists, have an advantage over theologians in that they start their investigations unhampered by *a priori* considerations that it is refreshing and reassuring to find Dr. Rudolf Allers frankly admitting that one of his three main starting-points is the Catholic conception of the Universe. The other two are the philosophical system of the *philosophia perennis* and the empiricism of modern psychological investigation, especially as represented in the individual-psychology teaching of Alfred Adler. This being the case, we are prepared to find radical divergencies from the representatives of all deterministic tendencies in psychology. Thus the theory of the school of psycho-analysts deriving from Freud is decisively rejected on *a priori* grounds, because it is inimical to Catholic theology. For Dr. Allers it is axiomatic that man belongs to the spiritual as well as to the natural order. Whilst admitting the existence of primary impulse, he regards it as the endowment of a created "person." An impersonal libido with certain genetic instinctive tendencies he regards as a projection of the hedonistic ethic on the plane of biology. What is acquired is character, which comes to be the law of preference by which a man determines his course of action. It arises from an innate seeking after the realization of a value which is not pleasure, but the satisfaction of the twin human characteristics of the will to power and the will to community. Action is always preceded by a judgment of value, and consequently the character of a person is made and revealed solely by his actions. The process by which individual ideals are built up comes, therefore, to take the place of importance which tends to be usurped by the congenital tendencies presupposed by the psycho-analytical school. Dr. Allers regards the Fall as a certain theological premise, and his conclusions are at many vital points determined by this judgment. Another axiom on which great stress is laid is the transmutability of character: thus the way is opened to the validity of the religious experiences of repentance and conversion. It is not very easy to follow exactly Dr. Allers' distinction between "person" and "character": it seems probable that a clearer exposition of this point would be possible without destroying the essence of the argument. The value of the book must largely be judged by the validity allowed to the method of departure from theological premises. If the hypothesis so arrived at accounts for the observed facts of human conduct, then the principle is surely entirely legitimate, and it is of the utmost value to have a book which makes this attempt.

The most useful part of the work, however, is the considerable amount of practical child-study which the book contains. Especially good is the treatment of the subject of authority in education. Dr. Allers thoroughly understands the right and wrong uses of authority, and rightly stresses the importance of realizing its object as being the leading to self-government and not to permanent external control. The grave perils of discouragement are given proper emphasis. The book contains much sound practical advice which will be of value to parents, clergy, and teachers in the character training of children. Particularly good is the treatment of adolescence in Chapter VI., in which the problem of sin is sanely handled. The author has a tantalizing habit of raising topics only to tell us that

this is not the place to discuss them, which somewhat mars the reader's enjoyment. The translator seems to have done his work with great skill.

A. R. BROWNE-WILKINSON.

CHILD LIFE AND RELIGION. By Ilse Forest. Williams and Norgate. 4s. 6d.

The author of this interesting book is well abreast of current psychological and educational thought. The general attitude taken towards the religion of children and the responsibility of teachers and parents is admirable. There is no doubt that the author fully understands the spiritual needs of children. There is much here that would be of practical value to teachers and parents. Unfortunately the theological position of the book is not, from a Churchman's point of view, at all satisfactory: the Incarnation is by implication put aside as a worn-out doctrine. This decidedly limits the extent to which the book can safely be recommended to our teachers.

A. R. BROWNE-WILKINSON.

THE MARTYROLOGY OF TALLACHT, FROM THE BOOK OF LEINSTER AND MS. 5100-4 IN THE ROYAL LIBRARY, BRUSSELS. Edited, with introduction, translations, notes and indices, by Richard Irvin Best and Hugh Jackson Lawlor. London.

This is volume sixty-eight of the Henry Bradshaw Society's Texts, issued for the year 1929. The Martyrology or Testology of Tallacht is contemporary with that of Óengus (late eighth or early ninth century), and is preserved in two defective MSS.—the Book of Leinster (twelfth century) and Brussels MS. 5100-4 (seventeenth century). Its distinguishing feature is the completeness of its aim—to include all the Saints in the Roman Calendar. Óengus drew upon it for his Félire. Tallacht Monastery was in the late eighth century illustrious for devotion and scholarship, for the so-called *Stowe Missal* and the *Rule* and *Penitential* emanated from it. The names of the Martyrs commemorated in the Roman Martyrology are followed by the Irish Saints (four of whom, by the way, are associated with Tallacht, as also the founder, Máel Rúain).

The editors give us, after their learned Introduction, the Latin text with variants (pp. 1-89), then the marginal notes and poems in Irish and English translation (pp. 92-127), and finally notes and indices—on the Roman Calendar, the Brussels Abstract, and persons and places in both the Roman and Irish Calendars. The marginal notes and poems are of very great interest—*e.g.*, that on pp. 118-121 on the Ember and Lenten fasts, and the "Ideal Cleric," pp. 110-112. The latter breathes ferociously asceticism of Celtic Christianity, together with a wistfulness of naïve piety:

> "Thy side half bare, thy bed half cold,
> From Christ, God's Son, mayest thou have thy reward.
> Grassless earth over earth
> At the end of thy journeying.
> Knowledge, steadfastness, patience,
> Silence without muteness,
> Humility, purity, patience.
> Take not the world, O cleric."

F. GAVIN.

RESERVATION AND CATHOLICITY. *A discussion between the Rev. A. H. Villiers, Canon of the Roman Catholic Cathedral at Birmingham, and G. G. Coulton, D.Lit., Litt.D., F.B.A., on the Bishop of Gloucester's text: Reservation is, in every true sense of the word, a Catholic custom.* Blackwell, Oxford. 2s. 6d.

This little book is an intriguing and stimulating commentary on the present stage of Roman controversy. Dr. Coulton is a doughty champion of truth and fact, with more than a little suspicion in his mind of the dogmatic generalizations commonly employed by Roman Catholics. Canon Villiers believes earnestly in the whole of his Church's dogmatic teaching, with a certain suspicion of individual elements of fact which would seem to be inconsistent. Whenever the former deals with facts he is in his element. We have long since learned both to venerate and trust his scholarship. Whenever the latter has to do with theory he feels secure, since by faith and practice he is part of a tradition in which the hard deposit of fact is but a precipitate from a living stream. The controversy between them is so unequal as to be very nearly cruel on Dr. Coulton's part.

Dr. Coulton sees the question regarding Eucharistic adoration as one of evolution; to Canon Villiers it is one of development. The scrupulous accuracy of the former in the marshalling of his facts does not necessarily destroy the effectiveness of the theory espoused by the latter. Canon Villiers envisages Eucharistic adoration as an inevitable outcome of early belief in our Lord's Presence in the Consecrated Elements, and the development that issues as a legitimate, normal, and logical unfolding of the latent and implicit into the self-conscious and explicit. To Dr. Coulton the series of items form no organic nexus: they are isolated phenomena, juxtaposed in time, but not necessarily intrinsically connected. The term of the course of change noted in the case of the practice of Eucharistic adoration he regards as innovatory, illegitimate, and essentially a departure from or a distortion of the earliest conception—whether as theory or practice—regarding the Eucharist.

With Dr. Coulton's scholarship no one can quarrel, though his theological deductions belong to a different order. Continental Roman scholars have drawn attention to many of the facts he presents, especially in the *Breslau Studies*, some of which are especially dedicated to the Eucharist. It would be an important addition to the material from early Church history which he used to include Hippolytus' *Apostolic Tradition*, as there are several references in it germane to the question. To the recovery of some of the lost or transformed elements in Eucharistic life the Liturgical Movement is bending its energies on the Continent. Dr. Coulton's remarks on p. 46 would be received by members of this movement without consternation: (the spirit) "which gradually transformed the Lord's Supper from a thoroughly congregational service, in which the chanting was done by the people and in which the minister addressed himself constantly to them, into a Mass where the priest turns his back upon the people, speaks in a foreign language words which even the most educated cannot always follow, and performs a rite which is held to have a certain intrinsic efficacy in itself, quite apart from the attention of the congregation." Dr. Coulton would distinguish and contrast "the Lord's Supper" and "the Mass," while Canon Villiers would say that they are the same thing. In a sense each is right, and in another both are wrong. That is why this little book is so interesting.

F. GAVIN.

GOD WITHOUT THUNDER. An Unorthodox Defence of Orthodoxy. By John Crowe Ransom. London: Gerald Howe, Ltd. 12s. 6d.

That an American Professor of English should come out with an appeal for a return to the God of the Old Testament, a "virile and concrete God," is startling enough in itself, even if it is premature to regard it as a sign of the times. The Barthian theology still seems remote from the interests and tendencies of humanistic circles. Mr. Ransom, who never mentions Barth, is almost super-Barthian in his dislike of the more genial religious climates and his intense aversion from a "this-worldly" Christianity which subordinates religion to science, God to man, and, within the terms of Christian theology, Jehovah the Father and the Holy Ghost to the Logos. He finds the secret of our religious and social ills in the enthronement of Christ, the Logos, the principle of reason, as the one true God. That happened when Christianity was westernized: "now Christ instead of God rules over the Occident."

It is a curious and, at times, difficult book. Professor Ransom is at his best when he is criticizing humanists who rewrite religion and try to give it a truly scientific appearance, and scientists who think that through their science they can provide a complete account of the world. The former fail to do justice to the element of "myth" in religion: they simply rule it out. But myth is an essential in religion: "it is a representation of the event which jumps clear out of the natural background": the myth aims at the whole; it "*resorts to the supernatural in order to represent the fullness of the natural.*" As for the scientists, they also have their myths, which are given in such terms as "the Universe," "Law," "Energy." Where the scientist fails is in his inability to do justice to the particular; in other words, in the partial character of his knowledge and in the subjectivism which remains after he has completed his work of analysis. The chapter, "God as a Mathematician," is of special interest in view of the wide circulation of Sir James Jeans' book. A great deal of the criticism is very much to the point: the mathematician and the physicist clash in Sir James' presentation of the nature of the world. But I do not think that he has committed himself to the declaration that God the Author of the universe is "simply a mathematician."

On what may be regarded as his more constructive side Mr. Ransom is less happy. His Christology seems to combine an indifference to the historical Jesus with a distinct preference for the Arian over the Nicene doctrine: this may result from his sense of the overworking of the idea of the Logos. He is very unfortunate at times in his comments on the New Testament, as when he says that its authors "nearly lost the Pneuma or the Holy Ghost out of their excessive devotion to the Logos as personified in Christ," and interprets the phrase "the Spirit of Truth" as a sort of antedated Hegelianism. Sir Edwyn Hoskyns would have put him right! And, after all, we cannot simply return to the Old Testament doctrine of God.

The modern reaction has not been without justification. Moreover, Mr. Ransom's view of the Old Testament doctrine is seriously amiss in its one-sidedness. These are important reservations: but, for all that, the book has real value as the work of an acute and independent thinker.

J. K. MOZLEY.

THE ETHIOPIC TEXT OF THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES. Edited by Samuel A. B. Mercer, M.A., Ph.D., D.D. Luzac. 8s. 6d.

Ethiopic is the least studied of the greater Semitic languages, and the world of scholarship has reason to be grateful to Dr. Mercer for giving himself as he does to the subject. In the present volume we have a contribution, not only to the study of Ethiopic in general, but also to the text of the Old Testament. Dr. Mercer has produced a thoroughly scholarly work, and has had the advantage of being able to use MSS. older and better than any yet known in Europe. Specimen pages of three of these appear in the plates at the end of the volume.

We may venture to hope that this and other of Dr. Mercer's works will help to promote the study of Ethiopic in Great Britain and America.

T. H. ROBINSON.

IN DEFENCE OF PURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CATHOLIC IDEALS OF PURITY AND VIRGINITY. By Dietrich von Hildebrand. Sheed and Ward. 6s.

One generally picks up a book on this subject with the expectation of finding a heavy reiteration of certain principles of moral theology leading to the conclusion, implied if not expressed, that sex is an evil thing and purity consists in its complete repression. It is a real pleasure to find in the book before us an exposition which is at once original and positive, human and Catholic. Purity is not a negative repression, but a flaming, virile virtue, and our author describes it, at times almost lyrically, in its true glory.

The English title of the book, apart from the subtitle, is rather misleading; for the work, as the author himself says, is not "a defence of purity and virginity against their detractors," but an exposition of "what constitutes the complete virtue of purity and wherein the ideal of purity consists."

Purity and Virginity are not synonymous, so this work is divided into two books, the first of which deals with Purity and the second with Virginity consecrated in the Religious Life. Book I. is divided again into three parts, the subjects of which are Sex, Purity, and the Attitude of the Pure in Marriage. Book II. is made up of two parts in which are discussed the Nature of Consecration and why the Virgin is the Bride of Christ. This is a wide field to cover in less than two hundred pages, and the book, as might be expected from the Professor of Philosophy in the University of Munich, is packed with thought; it is, consequently, not very easy reading, but it is extremely stimulating and presents an exposition of the whole subject at once lucid and valuable. The author's argument is so close-knit that it is impossible to attempt to describe it in a short notice; the book itself should be read and reread.

The translator has had a difficult task which he has discharged, on the whole, extremely well, though he has a few lapses; for instance, "correlate" used as a noun is not English, "affine" is extremely rare, and "in presence" is obsolete—but these are mere details. For the work itself we have nothing but praise.

F. P. HARTON.

THE MEETING OF THE ROADS. A scientific view of God and Man. By the Very Rev. R. O. P. Taylor. Nisbet. 6s.

The vogue for books discussing the varied relations between recent results in science and other branches of thought shows no sign of decline, and the reading public no doubt finds it very difficult to synthesize from the clamour of conflicting suggestions a reasonable and helpful standpoint. For this reason, if not for others, *The Meeting of the Roads* is to be welcomed as providing readably and in small compass suggestions which will go far to help the non-technical reader in forming a balanced outlook on modern knowledge. And although the author's style is clear and straightforward, there is no irritating "talking down to the level of the man in the street." The book almost takes the form of a series of essays, in each of which the author deals with some outstanding points. As one whose education has been scientific, the author does not regard recent discoveries as "bolts from the blue." Science is merely coming to its senses. The old hostility to religion is passing, but this does not mean that religious thought has been unaffected. On the contrary. For instance, while tending to confirm the Christian postulate that man is, spiritually speaking, the centre of the universe, science has modified profoundly the content of this postulate by developing our view of both man and creation and of their relation to God. The Christian Church must go forward with courage enough to believe that the Catholic Faith can only be enriched and not injured by new knowledge.

C. D. WADDAMS.

L'ENFANCE SPIRITUELLE. By F. D. Joret, O.P. Les éditions du cerf. 12 frs.

This is a reprint, with additions, of articles which have appeared in *La Vie Spirituelle*. They are meditational instructions on the State of Spiritual Childhood, a form of devotion very widespread in France in the seventeenth century, and recently again brought to the fore by St. Thérèse of Lisieux. The devotion is designed to produce simplicity and freedom of mind, but some of its exponents do not always distinguish between childlikeness and childishness. The true end of meditation is to draw out lights and truths hidden to the casual observer. But these meditations are pious embroideries—truth and logic are at times sacrificed to emotion, and fiction is not distinguished from fact.

V. I. RUFFER.

JOACHIM OF FLORA. By Henry Bett, M.A. Methuen. 6s. net.

Mr. Bett, to whom we are already indebted for an admirable monograph on John the Scot, presents in this work the first account in English of the remarkable figure of the Abbot Joachim and of his teachings, and traces also the repercussions of that teaching in Franciscan and other controversies of later generations. Joachim was a native of Calabria, who was born *c.* 1130 and died in 1202. Originally of the Cistercian obedience, he was released therefrom by Pope Celestine III. in order to found a new order of Flora, of which he was Abbot. In spite of his strange doctrines he was throughout his life a devoted son of the Roman Church with a horror of heresy. His writings represent, however, the mediæval equivalent of the earlier millenniarism. By the use of allegorical and "typological" methods of exegesis he produced from an intensive study of Holy Scripture

a bewildering system of fancies and prophesyings. His leading ideas resolve themselves into a division of universal history into three "Ages" ("*Status*"): that of the Father, that of the Son, and finally that of the Spirit. Each Age has its time of preparation, and only then its "*fructificatio*." The Age of the Father lasts from Adam to Zacharias; it is "fructified" in Abraham. On the analogy of the same number of generations, the Age of the Son is initiated in Uzziah, twenty-one generations from Abraham, fructified from Zacharias to the forty-second generation, and Joachim leads us to infer that the Age of the Spirit will therefore date from the year 1260. The preparation for that Age, however, had already begun with St. Benedict, who died in 543. Joachim develops these ideas, Mr. Bett tells us, "with almost a lyrical passion" in all his writings, especially his chief genuine works, the *Concordia*, or book of parallels between the Old and New Testaments, the *Exposition of the Apocalypse*, and a treatise on the Blessed Trinity called *Psalterium decem chordarum*. In after-times many spurious works were foisted on Joachim, such as the famous *Eternal Gospel* published in Paris in 1254, the composition of a Franciscan friar. In his definitely theological utterances Joachim was not happy, and some of his criticisms on Peter Lombard on the subject of the doctrine of the Trinity were condemned in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.

The later fortunes of Joachite ideas and the part they played in the struggles of Conventual and Spiritual Franciscans on the one hand and between the Regulars and the University of Paris on the other are succinctly traced in the concluding chapters of Mr. Bett's book. This short work will be accepted most gratefully by all interested in the movements of thought in the Middle Ages.

W. R. V. BRADE.

ELEMENTS OF EPISTEMOLOGY. By J. T. Barron, S.T.D. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 7s. 6d.

This elementary textbook is mainly occupied with criticism of views which in various ways obscure the possibilities of objective knowledge. The author endeavours to hold the scales evenly between empiricism and rationalism. The book would have gained by a more definite defence and statement of the "moderate realism" which is advocated, and, as an introduction to the scholastic theory of knowledge, it would have gained by a presentation in the modern idiom of that "actual" philosophy (in its epistemological worth) which gives to scholasticism its constructive principle and its point of contact with contemporary thought.

F. W. BUTLER.

CHRIST OUR BROTHER. By Karl Adam. Translated by Dom Justin McCann, O.S.B. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

Karl Adam's *Spirit of Catholicism*, as a successful attempt to show the essential unity which underlies the rich variety of Catholic faith and order, has attracted some attention from the beauty and lucidity of its style. *Christ our Brother* is confessedly not so homogeneous; the first edition (1926) contained only four chapters: the first three of the present book and a fourth which is found in the *Spirit of Catholicism*. The other four chapters do not appear to be directly connected with the

thesis of the original book; they contain and culminate in arguments for faith based on "the supernatural principle of unity pervading the whole visible Church and every part of it." "The one Christ prayed for the one visible Peter that his faith might not fail, and upon the one visible Peter rests the whole visible Church." Such Roman apologetic is not the interesting part of the book; the interesting thing is Karl Adam's frank and searching attack on the declension, common to Catholic and Protestant piety alike, from the true and primitive conception of the relation of Christ to the Father; this is contained in the earlier part. Thus Karl Adam asks:

"How many are there now who pray to the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost? And is not the Holy Ghost in particular for not a few devout people an Unknown God? Is it an exaggeration to say that in popular devotion a recognition of the Holy Trinity survives only in the Sign of the Cross and the Creed? The figure of Christ has, so to speak, drawn to itself all religious faith and devotion. When we think of God, we think of the glorified Christ . . . we do not pass beyond Christ to the Father."

The obscuring of the Humanity, the Brotherhood, the representative character of the new Adam, standing for man, making men His body —that is the fault which Adam says makes the Church no longer the soul's home, but something foreign, "a sort of bureau or institution to which he may go if he wants assistance"; here is the root of semipelagianism and of secret detachment from the Mystical Body of Christ. In the Eucharist Christ has, "so to speak, crossed over and is now by God's side, and Himself is the awful and unapproachable God, who perfects the mystery." Quoting Father Joseph Jungmann, S.J., Adam says "the memory of the God-Man who instituted the sacrifice is overlaid by the thought of the divine Presence."

Another consequence of the undervaluation of the Humanity is that the saints are called in to bridge the gulf: "Thus they took the place of Christ as intercessor of the praying community."

Such startling changes are, as Adam, following Jungmann, thinks, the result and inheritance in the Eastern Church of the struggle with Arianism. This can be seen, it is claimed, in the alterations made in every liturgy but the Roman, "the only one among all Christian liturgies that declined to revise its liturgical prayers in the struggle against Arian error." The only one, that is to say, which follows the rule of the twenty-first canon of the Synod of Hippo in 393—"*Semper ad Patrem dirigatur oratio.*"

But if the Roman liturgy is void of offence, the non-liturgical side of religion is far astray, owing to the wrong Christological balance: "Has not that Christianity, which we plant and water, become a weary, wilted, morose Christianity, and not a victorious and glad Christianity?" We note that Anglicans are not the only people who see that all is not well with their Church!

About the departure of evangelical piety from what strict dogma would allow Adam is no doubt right, and his book is a healthy sign, coming from whence it does. Whether Jungmann is correct in tracing the exaltation of the Divinity of Christ and the obscuring of His Humanity in the liturgies and in popular religion to anti-Arian sentiment is a big, if not so radical a question. In the Docetic *milieu* of the second century it is a wonder that any realization of the Humanity remained at all. Then we have as early as 112 in Pliny's letter the Bithynian Christians' witness

that "it was their habit on a fixed day to assemble before daylight and sing by turns a hymn to Christ as a God." Then again it might reasonably be argued that the separate cult of the Divine Son might have been emphasized in order to counteract Sabellian and Modalistic ideas.

This book cannot fail to quicken interest in Christology among all Christian thinkers.

W. J. FERRAR.

THIS CHURCH AND REALM. By Canon R. H. Malden. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.

This book gives in a handy form a very useful summary of the position, doctrinal and constitutional, of the Church of England, together with brief discussions on some of the questions generally in dispute at the present time. There are chapters on Holy Scripture, the Sacraments, Church government, and so on. The intention of the whole book is to provide guidance for the ordinary layman not possessed of specialized knowledge. From this point of view the book certainly achieves its object, and the statements, for example, of such doctrines as that of the Resurrection and of the Atonement are particularly well done. The same applies to the historical and explanatory treatment of the Creeds. There is also a valuable résumé of the work of the earlier Lambeth Conferences up to that of 1920.

On some other topics, such as Church government and modern movements of thought in the Church, the author is on more debatable ground. He sees clearly the difficulties inherent in the Vincentian Canon. but as so often happens in English books, it is misquoted, According to Vincent, the primary note of catholicity is the concurrence of present-day belief (*ubique*), the appeal to the past (*semper*) comes second. It may again be doubted whether the late Bishop F. Weston, when he appealed to catholic consent, really implied what is attributed to him on p. 32. The author makes the curious statement on p. 93 that "it would be impossible for the Roman Church to dispute the views of St. Thomas on the interpretation of Scripture, though his philosophy has been challenged." Of course, it is precisely the Thomistic *philosophy* which has been imposed as practically official by recent papal encyclicals, the latest dated 1923. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary does *not* imply, as stated on p. 79 and on p. 194 (note), that she had "no need of redemption." Nor does it seem quite accurate to call the Church at any period "a secret society." In the Index a correction is necessary of the entry "S. Thomas of Aquinas."

Many readers will find the criticisms of Anglo-Catholics which appear in various parts of the book a little captious in tone and more than once answered in effect by the implications of what is admitted in the text. From the final chapter it would appear that no existing phase of Anglican opinion pleases the author, and in consequence the particular brand of Anglicanism which he champions must, one would conclude, be the possession of a very small body.

W. R. V. BRADE.

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH. By the Very Rev. Michael Constantinides. Williams and Norgate. 6s.

GREEK CHURCH HISTORY. By the Rev. Constantine Callinicos. The Faith Press. Paper, 2s.; cloth, 3s.

The appearance of these books is timely. Both to a considerable extent cover the same ground, reviewing the history, doctrine, and present position of the Orthodox Church. Both give valuable information which could only otherwise be obtained from much larger and not easily accessible works. In both alike, however, the standpoint is predominantly Greek.

Dr. Constantinides divides his book into three parts, dealing respectively with a short sketch of Church history up to the sixth Œcumenical Council (A.D. 680), short but informing descriptions of the various Patriarchates and autocephalous Churches as they now exist, and lastly with the common faith and doctrine of the Orthodox Church. Sketches are also given of the careers of some of the leading ecclesiastical personalities at the present time. On controversial questions the author takes up a very definitely anti-Roman position, and this is true also of the preface contributed by Sir J. Gennadius. Perhaps in a book destined for English readers terms like "Stavropigion" (p. 93)—monastery exempted from episcopal control—might have been explained, but there are hardly any misprints save in the Latin quotation from Irenæus on p. 154.

Church history is the main subject of the Rev. C. Callinicos, but he deals also with the theology, theological literature, controversies, and inner life of the Orthodox communion. There is no attempt to hide defects or to present a merely ideal picture. The author also sees clearly the very serious problems which at the present day confront the Orthodox. He calls for the convocation of an Œcumenical Synod to consider not only the relationships of the Orthodox with other Christian communions, "especially with the Anglican Church" (p. 159), but many internal matters which demand attention, such as education of the clergy, simplification of rites, clerical marriage and so on. A short preface by Archbishop Germanos adds to the importance of this little book. Its primary object, as the Archbishop explains, is for the instruction of Orthodox, both children and adults, who live in countries where their mother tongue is not spoken, but it is certainly a book which no one interested in the Churches of the East can afford to neglect.

W. R. V. BRADE.

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